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Abstract
This work is a twofold contribution to the economic literature. First, we provide an Op-
timal Control theorem to transform a nonlinear infinite-horizon economic growth model
into an equivalent finite-horizon representation that can then be solved numerically. This
approach has several benefits compared to the methods currently in practice: (a) the non-
linear form of the model can be solved directly, avoiding log-linearization qualitative and
quantitative errors; (b) the dynamic system is solved at each point in time so studying
the transitional dynamics is now considerably easier; (c) shocks can hit the system at any
point in time and do not require the economy to be in a steady-state; (d) more complex
models, once deemed analytically intractable, can now be solved numerically. On top of
this, we developed a framework to exemplify the application of the theorem and demon-
strate its potential use in the exogenous and endogenous economic growth literature by
solving the original, nonlinear description of two standard models: the utility-maximizing
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans neoclassical growth model and the Lucas endogenous growth
model with human capital. We exemplified how to simulate shocks to a system that might
not be at its steady-state, a strong requirement still in use in the literature, as well as
multiple, sequential shocks.
In the second part, we studied optimal debt adjustment by applying the numerical
framework and developing a nonlinear endogenous growth model with public capital and
public debt in order to study the optimal fiscal policy to curb large levels of public debt.
Given that the model was solved in its nonlinear form, we were able to consider time-
variant tax rates and a quantitative budget rule. It is shown that the optimal fiscal adjust-
ment policy depends on the initial level of debt and the results suggest there is an inverted
U-shape negative relationship between debt and growth. In the short-tun, the strategy
consists in immediately cutting public expenditure, followed by a tax raise in the capital
income tax. In the long-run, public expenditure resumes, capital income tax converges to
zero and productive public spending is then fully supported by a tax on consumption.
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Resumo
Este trabalho apresenta duas contribuções para a literatura económica. Em primeiro lugar,
disponibilizamos um teorema de Controlo Óptimo que transforma um modelo de cresci-
mento económico não-linear e de horizonte-infinito num problema de horizonte-finito
equivalente que pode então ser resolvido numericamente. Esta abordagem tem vários
benefícios comparativamente com os métodos atualmente usados: (a) a forma não-linear
do modelo pode ser resolvida de forma numérica, evitando os erros qualitativos e quan-
titativos que podem emergir da linearização; (b) o sistema dinâmico é resolvido em cada
instante pelo que analisar a dinâmica de transição torna-se consideravelmente mais fá-
cil; (c) o sistema pode ser sujeito a choques em cada instante e não é necessário que a
economia esteja num ponto de equilíbrio; (d) modelos mais complexos, analiticamente
intratáveis, podem agora ser resolvidos numericamente. Adicionalmente, desenvolvemos
uma framework para exemplificar a aplicação do teorema e demonstrar o seu uso poten-
cial na literatura de crescimento económico exógeno e endógeno, para tal resolvendo a
versão original, não-linear, de dois modelos standard: o modelo neoclássico de cresci-
mento económico, Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans, e o modelo de crescimento endógeno e com
capital humano de Lucas. Exemplificamos também como simular choques numa econo-
mia que poderá não estar no seu equilíbrio, uma consideração geralmente assumida na
literatura, assim como choques múltiplos e sequenciais.
Na segunda parte, estudamos o ajustamento óptimo da dívida pública aplicando a
framework numérica e construindo um modelo não-linear de crescimento endógeno com
capital público e dívida pública, que permitirá estudar a política fiscal óptima para reduzir
grandes níveis de dívida. Considerando que o modelo é resolvido na sua forma não linear,
foi possível considerar taxas de imposto que podem variar com o tempo e ainda uma regra
orçamental quantitativa. Mostramos que a política óptima de ajustamento fiscal depende
no nível inicial de dívida e os resultados sugerem que existe uma relação em U invertido
entre dívida e a taxa de crescimento. No curto-prazo, a estratégia consiste em reduzir
imediatamente o investimento público, seguindo-se um aumento dos impostos sobre o
capital e o trabalho. No longo prazo, ocorre uma retoma da despesa pública, os impostos
sobre o capital e o trabalho converge para zero e o investimento público produtivo é então
financiado recorrendo unicamente a imposto sobre o consumo.
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“The curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men
how little they really know about what they imagine they can design.”
Friedrich von Hayek
Chapter 1
Introduction
"There’s no such thing as a free lunch"
– Milton Friedman
Unraveling the engine of economic growth is the key to prosperity. Homage is gener-
ally paid to the work of Adam Smith, heavily inspired by his scotisch compatriot David
Hume, one of the first intellectuals to refute mercantilism and to show how prices in a
country are strongly related to changes in the money supply — a first sketch of what we
now call the monetarist theory quantitity of money. It goes without saying that the work
of Hume and Smith set an important cornerstone in establishing contemporary economic
thought, but the study of the causes of the wealth of nations did not commence nor end
with Smith’s seminal book. We have to go back a couple of centuries and recover the
work of one of the greatest philosophers ever to be born, Aristotles. Not only did he pro-
vide a concise analysis of human motivation, Aristotles constructed the logical-deductive
framework that permitted concise and valid scientific thought to be derived. In Politics,
Aristotles explained the concept of money and how society evolved from barter to a mon-
etary economy. The work of the greek philosopher would last for all the medieval period.
Centuries later, an important school of thought emerged during Renaissance that would
not only later inspire Hume to further develop the concept of natural law, but also to leave
an important mark in the history of economic thought. It was the work of the Spanish
scholastics, most notoriously the School of Salamanca, the first to systematize the origin
of price as determined by its supply and demand. Their ideas on the ex ante mutual ben-
efit of individuals to freely exchange goods and services and the importance of private
property preceded Smith by almost two centuries. The work of these scholastics was so
important that it left a strong influence on Carl Menger, one of the marginalists and the
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founder of the Austrian school. In fact, well before the marginal revolution initiated by
Menger, Jevons and Walras, the scholastic Francisco Garcia was almost brought to the
brink of a marginal utility analysis of valuation by realizing that if bread were to outpace
the quantity of meat and become abundant in comparison to meat, its price would drop in
comparison to meat, which actually happened a few decades later. Despite the accurate
and rigorous economic analysis of such prominent scholars, the economic principles of
mercantilism would reign between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Smith’s contri-
bution to the fading of mercantilism was quintessential, but not without the influence of
one of the founders of modern economic thought, the mostly unknown Richard Cantillon.
None of these authors were able to decipher the fundamentals of economic growth.
Hume thought that inflation could generate economic growth. Unless we consider the in-
crease in the nominal accounting of prices to count as economic growth, he missed it. The
economists that later followed, like Thomas Malthus, ignored the impact that advance-
ments in technology can have in improving the general material welfare of the population,
i.e., real economic growth, and drew a pessimist account of the future. Austrians went
much further, authoring the “stages of production” approach and a comprehensive anal-
ysis of the creation of wealth. No price can be tagged to the work of Ludwig von Mises
in deciphering the basis of human action and incorporating micro-foundations that, al-
though conflicting with classical economics, were fundamental to understand the organic
and distributed essence of the economy. His view on the interest rate as a time-preference
discount rate — Mises witfully observed that we prefer present to future consumption —
along with Hayek’s explanation on the role of prices based on sound money to coordi-
nate actions between producers and consumers and efficient allocation of resources was
a breakthrough in the economics profession. At the same time, Keynes was performing
a facelift in the economics profession and introducing the definition of aggregates based
on statistical macroeconomic data. These were times of revolution in economics. Hayek
and Keynes were at the forefront in one of the greatest intellectual battles ever. But per-
haps because the Austrian school texts were mostly unavailable in English, the economic
theory of the anglo-saxon world prevailed up to this day.
It was not until the twentieth century that economic growth theory witnessed a major
contribution from an American economist, Robert Solow, that finally unveiled part of
the origin of economic growth and prosperity. He realized the role played by capital,
how it turns production into a more efficient process and how its accumulation benefits
society in general, regardless of who owns it. Moreover, the importance of technological
evolution and productivity enhancements was now systematized into a clear framework
capable of providing insightful clues and suggestions on how to enact growth. The seed
was planted. What emerged subsequently was a serious of seminal contributions to this
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theory. Ramsey, Cass and Koopmans added more microeconomic foundations assumed to
hold by the classical economists, that is, the maximization of the utility of consumption.
Romer, Lucas and Barro later succeeded with incorporating some of these exogenous
factors into the model, turning exogenous facets of the economy into endogenous factors
that lead to growth. They showed the importance of public and human capital as well as
R&D spillovers.
Nowadays, economic growth theory lost part of its appeal in opposition to neo-
Keynesian models that, despite having more consistent micro-foundations than traditional
Keynesian aggregate models, still fall short on incorporating a production function. The
explanatory power of these models was derogated in favor of its potentially predictive
capabilities. It might be conjectured that one of the reasons to be so was that the con-
struction of these models was severely limited by the scope of the analytical tools. A
simple endogenous growth model incorporating time-variant tax rates becomes analyti-
cally intractable due to the high degree of nonlinearity that is introduced. Adding to this,
any modification to the models involves complex and time-consuming calculus that may
demotivate the most perseverant of the researchers.
This brings us to the first contribution of this dissertation. With the natural ten-
dency to conceive models ever more complex comes the necessity of being able to solve
them. Analytical methods may no longer serve that purpose, despite their formal ele-
gance and rigorousness. Therefore, we resort to powerful numerical tools capable of
solving complex models. To meet this end, we have proved a theorem that explains how
to transform an infinite-horizon economic growth model, exogenous or endogenous, into
an equivalent finite-horizon form. This way, it is possible to apply state-of-the-art numeri-
cal tools to solve it. More specifically, we are able to solve an optimal control problem, the
mathematical underpinning of most economic growth models, using a direct method that
first discretizes the model and then transforms it into a Nonlinear Programming Problem
(NLP) which can be solved using advanced solvers. This contrasts with the traditional
approach of first applying Pontyagrin’s Maximum Principle in order to obtain the Nec-
essary Optimality Conditions (NOCs) and then, due to the impossibility of solving its
nonlinear form, loglinearizing it around the steady state. Besides the problems posed by
the loglinearization, which we will cover in the next sections, this approach also requires
the system to part from equilibrium, which may be an inaccurate assumption. Moreover,
the novel approach we propose opens the way to more complex models like those that,
as previously mentioned, contemplate time-variant tax rates. We use the framework we
propose to solve the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans exogenous growth model and the Lucas en-
dogenous growth model with public capital and we show how it can be used to simulate
non steady-state single shocks, along with multiple sequential shocks.
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In the second part of this work, we delve into one of the subjects most perplexing to
contemporary economists and we use the framework previously developed to shed a light
on the subject. The role of public debt or, more specifically, what is the impact of debt on
growth. Do they go hand-in-hand? Or perhaps one may put the other in jeopardy? Or a
mix of both, at different times? Starting with Barro and the introduction of public capital
and followed by Futagami with the introduction of public debt, the economic growth lit-
erature has been prolific in trying to understand the role of public investment and how to
finance it, which boils down to a financial decision on optimal capital structure. Accord-
ing to David Ricardo, it is irrelevant since households will compensate present borrowed
consumption and investment with savings to accommodate the future burden arising from
taxation. But that suggests that consumers will smooth their consumption whenever pos-
sible. It does not explain how debt can promote or affect growth in the long-run. The
contributions of Futagami, Maebayashi and Greiner help in showing how to adjust the
levels of debt, but more remains to be done.
We pick on these contributions and build upon them so as to concoct an endogenous
growth model with public capital and public debt in order to study the optimal adjustment
of debt. Thanks to our numerical framework, we are able to go one step further and
consider time-variant tax rates and a quantitative budget rule that does not enforce an
exogenous functional form between debt and growth. Also, we avoid log-linearization
potential qualitative and quantitative errors by solving its nonlinear form. This provides
with a consistent model to help studying the fiscal policy better suited to curb the levels
of public debt, at the same time minimizing the impact in terms of welfare cost, i.e., that
is optimal. It also allows us to derivate some interesting results that point to an inverted
U-shape relationship between debt and growth.
We are confident that these contributions may provide a considerable insight into one
of this age’s most challenging economic puzzles.
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Chapter 2
Optimal control of infinite-horizon
growth models: a numerical framework
“It is a myth that poverty in Africa is falling because of aid or redistribution.
It is falling because of economic growth”
– Xavier Sala-i-Martin
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2.1 Introduction
Optimal control theory has been extensively applied to the solution of economic problems
since the pioneering article of Arrow (1968). Its main application in economics is usu-
ally found within dynamic macroeconomic theory, more specifically in the repertoire of
both exogenous and endogenous economic growth models, like in Ramsey (1928); Uzawa
(1965); Lucas (1988); Romer (1994), to name but just a few. At their core, such models
typically incorporate microeconomic foundations and involve multiple distinct and de-
centralized optimization problems over an infinite-horizon. This formulation gives rise to
a system of nonlinear differential equations describing the economy. Nonlinearities usu-
ally arise from the diminishing marginal utility of consumption and from the diminishing
marginal productivity of the production factors, but can also be the result of incorporating
R&D (Williams and Jones, 1995) or government spending (Barro, 1990).
The study of these dynamic growth models follows a standard procedure, which con-
sists in applying Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle and obtaining the necessary optimality
conditions (NOC), along with the transversality condition. If we define initial values for
the state variables we have a complete description of the system, enough to expound the
economy around its steady state equilibrium. But the nonlinearity in the production and
utility functions and the saddle-path stability introduced by the forward-looking assump-
tion of agents, while not posing much of a problem in the characterization of the static
short-run, can indeed affect the analysis of the transitional dynamics following a structural
change or a policy shock, as Atolia et al. (2010) points out. According to the author, one
way of overcoming this issue is to linearize the dynamic system around its (post-shock)
steady state and then to study the properties of this linearized, thus simplified, version of
the dynamic system as a proxy to the original nonlinear system.
Linearization can be extremely misleading, though. In fact, this mathematical stunt
may yield specious predictions and lead to erroneous qualitative assessments, even when
probed near the steady state. Wolman and Couper (2003) had already identified the prob-
lem. They point out three main pitfalls of excess of reliance in the linearization process:
(i) spurious nonexistence, that is, results suggesting that there is no nonexplosive solution
when global analysis shows that one in fact exists; (ii) spurious existence, i.e., a unique
equilibrium found in the linearized version of the model while no equilibria indeed exists
for a wide range of initial conditions; and (iii) spurious uniqueness, when linearization
gives origin to a unique nonexplosive equilibrium when in fact there are multiple nonex-
plosive equilibria. Several studies have already shown how misleading the conclusions
may be when linearization is used. For example, Futagami et al. (2008) devised a model
to study the long-run growth effect of borrowing for public investment. If the public debt
target is defined as a ratio to private capital (b¯ ≡ B/K), as they originally do, then the
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model exhibits a multiplicity of balanced growth paths (BGP) in the long run and a pos-
sible indeterminacy of the transition path to the high-growth BGP. If, on the other hand,
one follows Minea and Villieu (2012) and opts to define the public debt target as a ratio to
output (b¯≡ B/Y ) then the model exhibits a unique BGP and a unique adjustment path to
equilibrium. This contrast in results highlights the fallacious influence linearization can
have on the interpretation of a model.
Atolia et al. (2010) conducted an extensive analysis on linearization pitfalls. Expect-
edly, they show that the further away the economy is from a steady-state equilibrium,
the larger are the errors generated by linearization, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
Furthermore, in models where government expenditure is introduced in the form of stock
of public capital, the linearized model over-predicts consumption and welfare gains from
an increase in public investment, providing an extremely erroneous signal to the policy
maker. More worryingly, the errors can be of a qualitative nature. The authors give an
example, where the linear proxy predicts a short-run increase in consumption, while the
original nonlinear model solution shows a decline. Their conclusion is remarkably im-
portant — linearization is potentially quite misleading. Notwithstanding, linearization is
still the dominant practice adopted in the macro-growth literature.
In fact, up until recently, and even with linearization at our disposal, the transitional
dynamics of models with stiff differential equations or giving origin to a center manifold
had hardly been investigated, as Trimborn et al. (2004) duly noted. Trimborn et al. (2004)
confer added importance to the transition process in growth models, insofar as the positive
and normative implications might differ dramatically depending on whether an economy
converges towards a BGP or grows along it, as we have already noted. Moreover, con-
ducting welfare comparisons between different policy regimes or instruments depends
on studying this process. Consequently, some numerical procedures started emerging to
overcome this problem, namely: “projection method” (Judd, 1992), the “discretization
method” (Mercenier and Michel, 1994), the “shooting method” (Judd, 1998), the “time
elimination method” (Mulligan and Sala-i Martin, 1991), the “backward integration” pro-
cedure (Brunner and Strulik, 2002) and the “relaxation procedure” (Trimborn et al., 2004).
The latter on is now widely used in the economic growth literature.
Although more reliable than linearization, the aforementioned procedures rely on
indirect methods to solve the intrinsic optimal control problem of the growth model. In-
direct methods, which are based on the calculus of variations, start by first applying Pon-
tryagin’s Maximum Principle and introducing an adjoint variable for each state variable in
order to obtain the NOCs (from the first order conditions of the Hamiltonian), along with
the transversality condition. According to Betts (2010, Chapter 4.3), indirect methods
might suffer from the following issues: a) the NOCs have to be computed explicitly, and
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an explicit expression for the Euler-Lagrange equation might be hard to determine, espe-
cially in systems with singular arcs; this is also far from flexible, since a new derivation
is required each time the problem is changed; b) problems with path inequalities require
an estimation of the constrained-arc sequence, which can be a considerably cumbersome
task; c) the basic method is not robust, requiring an initial guess for the adjoint variables,
which even if done properly can lead to ill-conditioned adjoint equations. Economic mod-
els are usually conceived with this in mind and sometimes simplifications are forced on to
them so that an analytical solution can be determined. Moreover, the transitional dynam-
ics are always studied assuming that the economy departs from a steady state. Real-world
economies have yet to reach the theoretical boundary set by a steady state1, and the ad-
justment trajectories differ sharply for a shock that hits an economy that is at a non-steady
state, as we will see in Section 2.4.
Given this, we propose a framework that transforms the infinite-horizon problem into
an equivalent finite-horizon representation so that a direct method (control discretization)
can be employed to solve the underlying infinite-horizon optimal control problem. The
procedure incorporates the work first proposed by Fontes (2001). It is worth stressing
that this approach has several advantages: (i) it solves a nonlinear programming problem
(NLP) and not its linear approximation; (ii) it is capable of solving complex problems
where the NOCs are hard to determine; (iii) allows for a non-steady state analysis of
the transitional dynamics; (iv) has the capability of studying anticipated shocks without
introducing discontinuities or reformulating the original problem; (v) allows for the study
of multiple sequential shocks (either expected or not); (vi) is easy to use, as no a priori
knowledge of the analytical trajectories is required and everything is handled numerically;
(vii) it is extremely robust, as the optimal control problem is solved using well-established
and tested NLP solvers.
The proposed method provides a significant contribution to the literature since it is
an alternative to either the linearization approach and to the above mentioned numerical
procedures. In addition to being more accurate, it allows for the study of the transitional
dynamics for models in a non-steady state, while keeping intact all the properties inher-
ent to a nonlinear model. Also, it permits the analysis of anticipated shocks like policy
measures, which are usually announced well before being enforced. Finally, it provides
a viable and straightforward way of examining the possible behaviors due to unexpected
shocks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the mod-
els that will be used as a testbed for the framework, namely the neoclassical Ramsey
1It is interesting to ask whether infinite growth is possible on a world with finite resources. If it is not,
economies will eventually reach a steady-state of no further growth, with capital growing just at the rate
required to compensate for depreciations and to equip new borns.
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growth model (Ramsey, 1928; Cass, 1965; Koopmans, 1963, – henceforth, RCK) and the
endogenous two-sector growth model of (Uzawa, 1965; Lucas, 1988, – henceforth, UL).
Section 2.3 describes the framework proposed, as well as its theoretical background. In
this section we also provide the numerical solution in the selected growth models. Sec-
tion 2.4 focus on the transitional dynamics of the models and shows the impulse responses
upon expected shocks and multiple and sequential shocks. Also, it compares the effect
of a shock when the economy is not at a steady state. Finally, a brief overview of our
findings can be found in Section 2.5.
2.2 Models of economic growth
In order to illustrate the use of the framework we will employ the RCK growth model, a
model exhibiting exogenous growth, and the UL endogenous growth model. The neoclas-
sical growth model exhibits saddle-point stability, and thus a closed-form solution exists
for a particular choice of parameters. This allow us to compare the accuracy of the numer-
ical results we obtain with the analytical solution of the system of differential equations.
The second model exhibits multi-dimensional stable manifold and is considerably more
complex. In fact, the transition process of this growth model has hardly been investigated
due to its intrinsic complexity. These models are a powerful workhorse for studying some
of the mechanisms of growth.
2.2.1 Neoclassical growth model
We will consider the version of the model as defined in Barro and Sala-i Martin (2003).
Our population grows according to L(t) = L(0) · ent , normalized to unity at t = 0. The
households wish to maximize their overall utility U by means of consumption, C. Also,
we consider a current-value formulation with a discount factor ρ . Since all variables are
time-dependent, for simplicity we will omit the subscripts. This can be summarized as
follows.
U =
ˆ ∞
0
u(C) · e(n−ρ)t ·dt, C ∈ [0,+∞). (2.1)
Families hold assets b and obtain capital gains from assets, rb, and wages from working,
w. Labor supply is inelastic and no unemployment exists. The budget constraint, in per
capita terms, is then represented by
b˙ = (r−n)b+w− c. (2.2)
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Utility is given by a constant inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (CIES) function
u(c) =
C(1−θ)−1
1−θ . (2.3)
To avoid numerical errors from potential divisions by zero we can replace the CIES func-
tion by one given in Equation (3.20)
u(C) =
C
1−θ
1−θ θ 6= 1
ln(C) θ = 1
(2.4)
We work with per effective worker ratios, so we need to transform the variable consump-
tion C. Henceforth, we consider “effective labor” to be given by Lˆ ≡ L ·X , the product
of raw labor and the level of technology. Let us denote c as the consumption per unit of
effective labor such that c≡C/Lˆ. We consider the technological progress to grow at rate
x, such that X = X(0) · ext . After normalizing X(0) to unity we obtain:
C1−θ
1−θ =
e(1−θ)xt · c1−θ
1−θ . (2.5)
This results in the objective function, rewritten in consumption per effective worker quan-
tities, given in Equation (2.6)
U =
ˆ ∞
0
c1−θ
1−θ · e
(n+(1−θ)x−ρ)tdt. (2.6)
The goods to be consumed are produced by firms by employing labor and capital. We
assume a standard Cobb-Douglas production function Y ≡ F(K, Lˆ) = AKα Lˆ1−α with 0 <
α < 1 and A the level of technology. We include labor-augmenting technological progress
at a constant rate, which we already know to grow at rate x. As done for consumption, we
will express all variables in quantities per unit of effective labor, y ≡ Y/Lˆ and k ≡ K/Lˆ.
The output of the economy can then be expressed in the intensive form as
y = f (k) = Akα , f (0) = 0. (2.7)
Goods and labor markets clear. From this assumption we know that supply and demand
quantities meet. This implies that the supply of loans b is met by the demand of capital, k.
With this in mind we can write the resource constraint for the overall economy, expressed
in units of effective labor, as given in Equation (2.8)
k˙ = f (k)− c− (x+n+δ )k, k(0) = k0, k ≥ 0. (2.8)
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Equations (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) sum up the interactions between agents in the Ramsey
growth model.
2.2.2 Uzawa-Lucas endogenous growth model
The neoclassical growth model falls short of explaining the engine of long-term growth
in income per capita observed in developed countries. The introduction of technological
progress causes such phenomenon to occur but provides no explanation on its origin.
Endogenous growth models were conceived as an attempt to overcome such theoretical
fragility and to give a consistent account to what causes economies to keep on growing.
One prominent endogenous growth model was developed by Uzawa (1965) and later used
by Lucas (1988). We follow the formulation laid by Barro and Sala-i Martin (2003).
The Uzawa-Lucas model introduces human capital h, another productive input of the
economy that is produced by a different technology than that of physical capital K. Also,
labor L can be partly employed on the final output production, µ , with the remaining
share 1−µ dedicated to formal education. This model provides for a very comprehensive
assessment of the capabilities of our framework. On the one hand, it exhibits steady-state
growth, meaning that consumption and capital (physical and human) are unbounded. On
the other hand, the introduction of human capital and specialized labour add another state
and control variables to the system, respectively, which results in increased complexity.
In fact, the transition process of this model is still unclear, since the indirect methods
for solving the underlying optimal control problem employed by researchers give origin
to stiff ordinary differential equations, again adding an extra burden to the task of the
analyst, as Trimborn et al. (2004) notes.
This model uses the Ramsey consumption-optimizer framework specified in Section
2.2.1. As before, households try to maximize their utility by consuming according to a
standard CIES function u(C).
U =
ˆ ∞
0
u(C) · e−ρtdt. (2.9)
Goods are produced according to the following production function given by Equation
(2.10)
Y = AKα(µhL)1−α . (2.10)
Physical capital K and human capital H growth follow the laws of motion stated in Equa-
tion (2.11)
K˙ = Y −C−δKK
h˙ = B(1−µ)h−δHh
, (2.11)
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where B > 0 is a constant reflecting productivity of quality adjusted effort in education
and δH (0≤ δH < B) is the rate of depreciation of human capital, which is set to zero.
Considering per-capita variables k ≡ K/L, y ≡ Y/L and c ≡C/L and no population
growth (n = 0) we obtain the description of the economy
maxU =
ˆ ∞
0
c1−θ
1−θ e
−ρtdt, s.t. (2.12)
c > 0, 0≤ µ ≤ 1
k˙ = Akα(µh)1−α − c−δkk
h˙ = B(1−µ)h
k(0) = k0 k ≥ 0, ∀t > 0
h(0) = h0 h≥ 0, ∀t > 0
(2.13)
with the social planner or household choosing an allocation (c,µ)∞t=0 that maximizes U .
2.3 A framework for infinite-horizon models
The framework we present is inspired by the work on model predictive control (MPC),
originally conceived to address industrialized optimal control problems with infinite-
horizon objectives, but for which only finite-horizon computations are feasible. In par-
ticular, we refer to the quasi-infinite horizon approach of Chen and Allgöwer (1998) and
the general framework of Fontes (2001). The procedure is as follows: we transcribe the
infinite horizon problem into a finite dimensional, NLP representation of the initial prob-
lem, which we prove to be an equivalent representation of the original. We then use a
state-of-the-art NLP solver to find the optimal trajectories. We are in fact first discretizing
and then optimizing, inverting the process used by indirect methods.
This approach overcomes the problems already identified in Section 2.1 while in-
troducing several degrees of freedom. The optimal trajectories can be numerically de-
termined without requiring the linearization of the differential equations. This, in itself,
avoids the problems posed by a change of base or any other supposedly neutral manipu-
lations. Also, it allows for the study of the transition process without having the system
depart from or be at a steady state. Actually, the economy can depart from any given
state. Furthermore, it is a powerful tool to study complex phenomena like anticipated or
multiple, sequential shocks.
Indeed, one does not need to derive or even know any necessary optimality conditions
(NOCs), which can be especially useful for problems whose adjoint functions are hard to
determine. In fact, this is the current method of choice in the field of optimal control for
engineering applications due to its easy applicability and robustness.
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We start by showing the theorem and the proof and then we do a numerical im-
plementation and solution of two mainstream economic growth models to serve as an
example.
Theorem 1. Consider the following generic optimal control problem.
P∞ : max
ˆ ∞
0
L(t,x(t),u(t)) ·dt, (2.14)
subject to:
x˙ = f (x,u) a.e.
x(0) = x0,
x(t) ∈ Γ(t),
u(t) ∈Ω(t)
for which we assume there is a finite solution. Assume additionally that after some
time T , the state is within some invariant set S (that is, x(t) ∈ S, S ⊂ Γ(t), for all t ≥ T )
for which the problem still has a finite solution. Then, there exists a terminal cost function
W, such that the problem is equivalent to the finite horizon problem
PT : max
ˆ T
0
L(t,x(t),u(t)) ·dt+W (x(T )), (2.15)
subject to:
x˙ = f (x,u) a.e.
x(0) = x0,
x(t) ∈ Γ(t),
u(t) ∈Ω(t),
x(T ) ∈ S.
Proof. Consider problem P∞ with the additional assumption, x(t) ∈ S for t ≥ T , i.e., re-
define Γ(t) = S for all t ≥ T . By Bellman’s optimality principle the value for P∞ is
V (0,x0) = max
{ˆ T
0
L(t,x,u(t)) ·dt+V (T,x(T ))
}
.
We can now define W (x)⊂V (T,x) and since x(t) ∈ S for all t ≥ T we have
W (x(T )) =V (T,x(T )) = max
x∈S
{ˆ +∞
T
L(t,x,u) ·dt
}
.
We can then rewrite the problem as PT .
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2.3.1 Application
The above theorem is useful only for the case that the set S is such that a characterization
of the solution to the problem
W (x(T )) = max
x∈S
{ˆ +∞
T
L(t,x,u) ·dt
}
is possible (via NCO or other means) and therefore we can explicitly compute W (x) for
any x ∈ S.
One such example is when economies are at a balanced growth path (BGP), either
because the characteristics of the problem always lead to it, or because we assume (or
impose) that to be the case. We will exemplify how to use the framework on two of such
models, previously described in Section 2.2.1 and in Section 2.2.2.
The procedure is as follows:
1. Transcribe the infinite-horizon problem into an equivalent finite-horizon problem
by applying Theorem 1;
2. Add the necessary boundary conditions that ensure that the set S is invariant (and
so W (x) can be computer explicitly for any x ∈ S);
3. Use a NLP solver to determine the trajectories of the control and state variables.
2.3.1.1 Neoclassical growth model
Consider the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans growth problem described in Section 2.2.1. If we
impose that ρ > n+(1−θ)x so that the model converges to a BGP, with k(t)= k∗ constant
for t ≥ T , then define
S = {k : k˙ = 0}⇔
S = {k : A(k∗)α − c∗− (δ +n+ x)k∗ = 0}, k(T ) ∈ S (2.16)
where k∗ and c∗ are given by the values obtained at instant T , i.e., k∗= k(T ) and c∗= c(T ).
Equation (2.16) is the invariant set S required by Theorem 1. Using the definition above,
we can define
c∗(k∗) = A(k∗)α − (δ +n+ x)k∗. (2.17)
We are now in a position to compute W , the boundary cost. From Theorem 1 we know
that
W (k∗) = max
ˆ +∞
T
L(t,k∗,c∗)dt
with L(t,k∗,c∗) = u(c∗(k∗)) · e−ρt . We then have
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W (k∗) = max
ˆ +∞
T
u(c∗(k∗)) · e−ρt =U(·,∞)−U(·,T ) (2.18)
We apply a discount factor ρ and ensure that ρ > n+(1−θ)x must hold true for all t, so
U(·,∞) is 0. Hence, W will be equal to −U(·,T ).
Since U is defined by Equation (2.6), it is trivial to integrate Equation (2.18) and
obtain the following value for the boundary cost
W (k∗) =− e
(n+(1−θ)x−ρ)t
ρ−n− (1−θ)x ·
c∗(k∗)(1−θ)
1−θ . (2.19)
The problem is then to
max
ˆ T
0
u(c)e−ρtdt+W (k(T )), (2.20)
subject to (2.8) and the boundary condition
k(T ) ∈ S⇔ k˙(T ) = 0⇔ Ak(T )α − c(T )− (n+ x+δ )k(T ) = 0 (2.21)
2.3.1.1.1 Numerical solution
The next step is the implementation of the transcribed finite-horizon problem as described
in the previous section on a NLP solver. In order to numerically solve this problem we
will make use of the Imperial College London Optimal Control Software2 (ICLOCS). As
a general guideline, we also show how to specify the model as required by ICLOCS. Of
course, another interface to an NLP solver could be used instead.
To run a simulation we will use the following parameterization. We will consider
a fixed 300 year timespan (tmin=300, tmax=300), enough for the model to grow and
converge, since it exhibits saddle-point stability. Without loss of generality, we will
define the initial stock of private capital k to be ten percent of its steady state value
(k∗ ' ( αAδ+ρ+θx)1/(1−α), k0 = 0.1k∗). State bounds are also fairly loose. k can assume
any non-negative value since there is no economic definition of negative capital stock
(0≤ k < ∞) and the corner solution (k = 0) is non-optimal. In the end, capital should ap-
proach its steady state value (k(T )' k∗). As for the input boundaries, we will just say that
consumption per unit of effective labor c is limited between zero and infinity (0≤ c <∞).
Again, a negative consumption has no meaning in economic terms.
For the parameterization of the model we will strictly follow the benchmark set by
Barro and Sala-i Martin (2003), reported in Table 2.1. These are standard values.
2http://www.ee.ic.ac.uk/ICLOCS/ — This software solves optimal control problems with general path
and boundary constraints and free or fixed final time. It uses another intermediary piece of software called
Interior Point Optimizer (IPOPT) to solve the transformed NLP problem.
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Parameter α θ ρ n x δ
Value 0.3/0.6 3 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Table 2.1: Calibrated parameters for the numerical simulation of the RCK model. Values taken from (Barro
and Sala-i Martin, 2003).
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Figure 2.1: Numerical trajectories for the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model, using Barro and Sala-i Martin
(2003) benchmark.
Figure 2.1 depicts the results obtained. As expected, the stock of private capital k,
the consumption c and the output of the economy y in units of effective labor all converge
to their steady state values k∗, c∗, y∗. These results are fully in line with the ones obtained
by Barro and Sala-i Martin (2003). In the end, we will compare consumption to its steady
state value (c∗'A(k∗)α−(n+x+δ )k∗, c(T )' c∗). Likewise, the same will be done with
the output of the economy, which should converge to its steady state value (y∗ ' A(k∗)α).
2.3.1.2 Uzawa-Lucas endogenous growth model
As before, consider the Uzawa-Lucas growth model described in Section 2.2.2 by equa-
tions (2.12) and (2.13).
We know that in balanced growth the following holds true for our specification of the
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model
c˙
c
=
k˙
k
=
h˙
h
=
y˙
y
= γ
for some constant γ > 0. If we define ω ≡ k/h and χ ≡ c/k, we know that ω˙ = 0 and
χ˙ = 0 holds true in the steady state, for t ≥ T (see Barro and Sala-i Martin (2003) for
details). Define the control policy c(t) and u(t) such that
c(t) = χk(t)
k(t) = ωh(t)
(2.22)
and χ, ω are both equal to a given positive constant.
We have that
k˙
k
= Akα−1(uh)1−α − (χ+δ ) = (uh
Ak
)1−α − (χ+δ ) = ( u
Aω
)1−α − (χ+δ ) = γ,
and
h˙
h
=
χ k˙
χk
=
k˙
k
= γ.
On the other hand,
c˙
c
=
χ k˙
χk
=
k˙
k
= γ
and
k˙
k
=
ω h˙
ωh
= B(1−u) = γ.
So (2.22) is achieved with u(t) = u constant satisfying
B(1−u) = ( u
Aω
)1−α − (χ+δ ).
Moreover we have
c˙
c
=
k˙
k
=
h˙
h
= B(1−u),
which implies that c˙ = γc in a BGP. At the end time (t = T ) consumption c will continue
to grow at rate γ , according to
c(t) = c(T ) · eγ(t−T ), t ∈ [T,+∞) (2.23)
which enable us to compute W . Utility will be bounded as long as ρ > γ(1−θ), meaning
that U(·,∞) = 0. The boundary cost is then given by integrating equation (2.12) incorpo-
rating the definition of c(t) from Equation (2.23).
W =−
ˆ ∞
T
(c(T )eγ(t−T ))1−θ
1−θ e
−ρtdt,
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which we know to be equal to
W =− e
γ(1−θ)−ρ
ρ− γ(1−θ) ·
[c(T )e−γT ]1−θ
1−θ . (2.24)
The boundary condition becomes
S = {(k,h) ∈ R2 : k˙
k
− h˙
h
= 0} (k(T ), h(T )) ∈ S. (2.25)
2.3.1.2.1 Numerical solution
The system as defined by Equation (2.13) along with the boundary cost (2.24) and the
boundary condition (2.25) is all that is required to solve the model numerically. The
model was run with the parameters set to those of Table 2.2.
Parameter A B α θ ρ δK δH
Value 1 0.136 0.3 3 0.03 0.05 0
Table 2.2: Calibrated parameters for the Uzawa-Lucas model.
Figure 2.2 depicts the optimization results obtained upon running the model from an
arbitrary starting point (k0, h0). As can easily be seen and is expected, c, k, h exhibit
constant growth when the system is in equilibrium. On the contrary, ω and χ converge
to a stationary state, as expected. Also, we see that in this economy approximately 2/3
of labor will be employed in producing final goods, while the remaining 1/3 will be
developing human capital.
2.3.2 Evaluation of numerical results
In order to assess the quality of the numerical results obtained we will follow a now
standard approach in the literature to measure the accuracy of numerical methods. This
is the procedure conducted in other studies like those of Aruoba et al. (2006) or Heer and
Maußner (2008). We will calculate the residual against a closed-form linear analytical
solution of the RCK model. Since the other numerical methods use an indirect approach,
the residual they calculate is for the Euler equation, the ordinary differential equation that
describes how consumption evolves over time. The Euler residual provides a (unit-free)
measure of the percentage error in the consumption trajectory of the household. In our
case, we can directly compare the trajectory for consumption c(t) we obtain numerically
against the one determined analytically. This is in fact a more robust comparison, since
the Euler equation is mostly concerned with the asymptotic properties of the accuracy of
the numerical solutions. As Atolia et al. (2010) duly point out, this might be of interest to
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Figure 2.2: Numerical optimization of the Uzawa-Lucas endogenous growth model.
the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) literature, but not so much to growth
theory, since we are concerned with the complete transitional path.
For the closed-form analytical solution of the RCK model we will follow Brunner
and Strulik (2002). They show that for the particular case when (αδ )/(δ + ρ) = 1/θ
holds true, the consumer will select a constant savings rate of s = 1/θ and the solution of
the model is
k(t) = [
s
δ
+(k1−α0 −
s
δ
)e−δ (1−α)t ]
1
1−α (2.26)
and c(t) = (1− s)k(t)α . For this particular case the authors assume no technological
progress and no population growth. Accordingly, the parameters were set as reported in
Table 2.3 and the residuals of the trajectories for the consumption c(t) were calculated for
the interval [0.1k∗,2k∗].
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Parameter α θ ρ n x δ
Value 0.3 4.6(7) 0.02 0 0 0.05
Table 2.3: Calibrated parameters as set byBrunner and Strulik (2002) for the numerical simulation of a
particular closed-form solution to the RCK exogenous growth model.
Figure 2.3 depicts the logarithm of the consumption’s trajectory c(t) residual against
the stock of private capital, k. Like Aruoba et al. (2006) and Ambler and Pelgrin (2010),
we opt for reporting the absolute errors in base 10 logarithms as it facilitates the economic
interpretation. A value of -3 means a $1 mistake for each $1000 spent, a value of -4 a $1
mistake for each $10 000, and so on. These results go in line with Euler residuals obtained
for other numerical procedures, most of them identified in this paper and summarized in
Aruoba et al. (2006). It is worth noting that near the steady state (k∗ ' 7.96) the log
residual error of -16 is most neglectable.
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1Figure 2.3: log10 of the residual of the consumption trajectory.
Moreover, in Table 2.4 we present maximum absolute errors for the trajectories of
consumption c(t), stock of private capital k(t) and output of the economy y(t). We also
show a measure of the errors as a percentage of the initial pre-shock equilibrium value,
namely by calculating the ratio xA(T )−xN(T )x0 , a procedure also followed by Atolia et al.
(2010).
The results obtained, along with the residual for the consumption trajectory, are ex-
tremely satisfactory when in comparison to all the other available procedures, according
to the results published by Aruoba et al. (2006).
2.4 Transitional dynamics
The framework we propose is especially useful for the analysis of the transitional dynam-
ics arising from policy or structural shocks. Without any reformulation of the problem,
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α = 0.3 θ = 4.66(7)
Max Abs Error (xA(T )− xN(T ))/x0 Error
k0 = 0.1k∗ k0 = 2k∗ k0 = 0.1k∗ k0 = 2k∗
c 0.00610 0.00117 0.88182e−4 0.2549e−4
k 0.01638 0.00271 0.00353 0.1653e−4
y 0.00208 0.1895e−3 0.21159e−3 0.8056e−4
α = 0.5 θ = 2.8
Max Abs Error (xA(T )− xN(T ))/x0 Error
k0 = 0.1k∗ k0 = 2k∗ k0 = 0.1k∗ k0 = 2k∗
c 0.01097 0.00512 0.00115 0.37462e−4
k 0.08491 0.02317 0.00713 0.16750e−3
y 0.00828 0.00162 0.00113 0.11841e−3
Table 2.4: Maximum absolute errors and relative errors as a percentage of the initial pre-shock equilibrium
value for two distinct benchmarks, one using the values α = 0.3, θ = 4.66(7) and the other using α =
0.5, θ = 2.8.
one can easily study expected or unexpected shocks, either departing from a steady state
or not. Moreover, it is also extremely easy to study a sequence of multiple shocks. The
innovation is that the economy does not have to converge to a new steady-state before a
new shock can be applied. Shocks can occur at any given time.
In order to exemplify how to use the framework to study the transition dynamics we
will extend the RCK model from Section 2.2.1 with the introduction of proportional taxes
on wage income, τw, private asset income, τr, and consumption, τc. We follow Barro and
Sala-i Martin (2003). This time we assume no technological progress, with no loss of
generality.
This extension requires a change to equation (2.2), the budget constraint of the house-
holds. The budget constraint will then become
b˙ = (1− τw)w+(1− τr)rb− (1+ τc)c−nb (2.27)
with r = αkα−1−δ and w = (1−α)kα . Since markets clear with b = k, equation (2.27)
is also the global constraint of the economy, which assumes the following form
k˙ = (1− τw)(1−α)kα +(1− τr)αkα − (1+ τc)c− (n+δ )k (2.28)
These modifications allow us to introduce exogenous shocks by manipulating the policy
variables {τw,τr,τc} and therefore study how the economy copes with a certain expected
or unexpected change of policy.
For the parameterization we will consider the values specified in Table 2.5.
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Parameter α θ ρ n x δ τw τr τc
Value 0.3 2 0.02 0.01 0 0.03 0.4 0.3 0.1
Table 2.5: Calibrated parameters.
2.4.1 Expected shocks
In this particular case, the agents show perfect foresight, i.e., it is assumed that at the point
in time when the maximization occurs, the maximizing agent is aware of the whole set
of information. If that holds true, then it is also true that it knows the future time path
of variables exogenous to the model, like those of the tax rates. We will first consider a
simulation of an expected shock to the RCK model and then to the UL model.
To study such shocks, authors like Trimborn (2007) suggest a reformulation of the
optimization problem, namely by decomposing the functional form of the objective func-
tion from f (1) to f (2) and the state equations from g(1) to g(2) at time t˜, when the shock
occurs. The necessary optimality conditions would have to be augmented with the condi-
tions derived from the interior boundary condition, that for this case are ψ[t˜] = t˜−t jump =
0. Moreover, the adjoint variable functions introduced by the Maximum Principle have to
attend to a continuity requirement, also known as the Weierstrass-Erdmann corner condi-
tion. For further details, Bryson and Ho (1975) provide an exhaustive explanation.
We do not require any reformulation of the RCK model. The only step needed is to
set a change of τc to 20% at time t = 20. Again, we will depart from the steady state, with
k0 = k∗.
In Figure 2.4 we present the responses when an expected policy shock takes place.
The results come as no surprise and are in line with the ones obtained by Trimborn (2007).
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Figure 2.4: Impulse responses to an anticipated increase in τc at t = 20.
We also show how the UL model reacts to an anticipated shock. We will consider
the scenario of an increase in the elasticity of physical capital from α = 0.3 to α = 0.4
at time t = 50. This means that the marginal productivity of capital increases, so it will
become more attractive to work in the production of final goods.
Figure 2.5 presents the responses of the model to such shock. From a quantitative
point of view, we have a welfare increase of 0.132% (welfare with no shock is U0 =
−9.1678 and with the aforementioned shock it raised to Us =−9.1557). But this analysis
is particularly interesting from a qualitative point of view. Expectedly, we can see a
surge in the share of labor dedicated to production in the final goods sector, reaching
µ = 1. Since there is no capital attrition, swapping labor between producing final goods
and developing human capital comes at no extra cost, but in a more real case scenario it
would probably have a greater effect on the evolution of human capital.
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Figure 2.5: Numerical optimization of the Uzawa-Lucas endogenous growth model when subject to an
anticipated capital elasticity increase from α = 0.3 to α = 0.4 at time t = 50.
2.4.2 Non-steady state shocks
The available numerical approaches assume that the economy departs from a steady state
prior to being hit by a shock. Indeed, such information is usually an input of the procedure.
To be more precise, some methods (like Trimborn et al., 2004) do not require to start
from a steady state, but rather calculate the state of the system at its equilibrium prior to
applying a shock, which is conceptually the same.
In our framework there is no requirement to start from a steady state. In fact, a
non-steady state analysis is more realistic in the sense that no empirical studies have
consistently reported a real world economy to be at its long-term equilibrium state.
Consider the same shock as above, but now taking place for three different values of
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k0 = {0.5k∗,k∗,1.5k∗} (since the shock takes place at t˜ = 20, it is closer to its steady state
but still distant enough to serve as a viable example). In the first case, where k0 = 0.5k∗,
the initial value for the stock of private capital is set to half of its equilibrium value. In
the second case, with k0 = k∗, we are starting from an equilibrium state that goes fully
in line with the results already obtained and represented in Figure 2.4 and also reported
by Trimborn, 2007. In the third case, the value for k0 is set to 50% higher than its steady
state, with k0 = 1.5k∗.
As can be seen from Figures 2.6, the outcome is substantially different. From a
qualitative point of view, the trajectory of consumption c(t) manifests a widely different
behavior depending on its starting point. In the case where the economy is way over its
steady state (red dashed line), there is a sharp drop in the consumption after the shock,
as expected, and it continues to converge to its steady state. The adjustment trajectory
is quite similar to the case when the economy departs from its steady state (blue straight
line). But when the economy departs from a state considerably lower than its equilibrium
value (green dashed line) the trajectory is considerably different. Instead of showing a
continuous drop in the consumption, it can be seen that after the shock a sudden drop
occurs but it is partially mitigated by a subsequent increase up until the new steady-state.
The savings rate also exhibits a contrasting effect. Instead of rising (agents will necessar-
ily consume less when their budget decreases), the savings rate will actually decrease for
the case when the economy departs from a state over its equilibrium value, with a sudden
increase at the time the tax policy comes into effect.
Actually, the behavior of consumption is not the only exhibiting such sharp differ-
ences in the adjustment trajectory. Also, there is no overshooting of the investment in
stock of private capital, as occurs when the economy departs from a steady-state. Same
happens with the output of the economy.
From a quantitative point of view, a welfare analysis shows also a difference in costs
of adjustment, albeit with a major difference in qualitative and quantitative terms after the
shock. Looking at the whole horizon, consumption decreases and so does the welfare.
But if we look only to the period after the shock, we can clearly see a welfare decrease
for the economy departing from and above the steady state, but a welfare increase for
the economy departing from below its equilibrium. From a qualitative standpoint, it has
a far better acceptance since an increase in consumption even when not exploited to its
potential level is still better than a drop.
Table 2.6 summarizes the welfare analysis for each of the starting initial values of k0.
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Expected Shock (τ0 = 0.1, τt˜ = 0.2)
Initial value (k0) Welfare (no shock) Welfare Cost
0.5k∗ -124.5585 -133.5139 8.9554
k∗ -117.3117 -126.0254 8.7137
1.5k∗ -112.6665 -121.1948 8.5283
Table 2.6: Welfare analysis for three distinct initial values for k0 upon an expected shock hitting the RCK
growth model.
2.4.3 Multiple, sequential shocks
Another very interesting application of the framework is to simulate multiple sequential
shocks, something not seen in the literature due to the complexity of determining the new
optimal paths from the original necessary optimality conditions. Also, we allow for the
optimization to occur from a non-steady state, like in Section 2.4.2. Otherwise, if we
allowed enough time for the economy to convert back to a new steady state, these sequen-
tial shocks could be simulated using traditional methods by connecting the responses to
each shock. The deed is even more complex for anticipated shocks as the system becomes
increasingly complex.
Again, such analysis is made possible by the fact that the framework transforms the
problem into an equivalent problem that can be solved numerically using a direct method,
meaning that optimization is done a posteriori.
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.81
0.82
0.83
0.84
0.85
0.86
Years
c
Consumption
1
0 20 40 60 80 100
8
8.2
8.4
8.6
8.8
9
Years
k
Stock of Private Capital
1
0 20 40 60 80 100
1.86
1.88
1.9
1.92
1.94
1.96
Years
y
Output
1
8 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 9
0.81
0.815
0.82
0.825
0.83
0.835
0.84
0.845
0.85
0.855
k
c
Phase Diagram (k,c)-space
1
Figure 2.7: Responses to multiple sequential shocks, both expected. The first is an anticipated increase in
τc at t = 20 and the second is a decrease in τk at t = 40.
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Figure 2.7 shows the responses of the RCK model augmented with taxes to an an-
ticipated increase in the consumption tax τc at time t˜ = 20 from τc,0 = 0.1 to τc,t˜ = 0.2
followed by a decrease in the capital tax τk at time t˜ = 40 from τk,0 = 0.3 to τk,t˜ = 0.1. It is
interesting to observe that from both a qualitative and a quantitative point of view house-
holds will be worse off, even if the tax decrease on capital could potentially increase the
long-term output of the economy, therefore making for the levying of the consumption
tax. Also, it is interesting to observe the adjustment trajectories for consumption c and for
the stock of private capital k.
2.5 Summary
We have proposed a new framework capable of solving and simulating the transitional
dynamics of nonlinear continuous and discrete growth models. This is made possible by
the theorem that assures that we can represent an infinite-horizon with a finite-horizon
formulation, so that we can solve the underlying optimal control using a direct method.
Although such methods are widely used in the control of industrial processes, this ap-
proach is new in the economic growth literature, in which most of the relevant numerical
procedures making use of indirect methods. The procedure is extremely powerful as
it is not limited to problems whose NOCs can be derived and solved analytically. We
have already highlighted some of the main advantages when compared to the available
procedures, but it is worth emphasizing that this framework allows for the study of the
transitional dynamics of models that are not at their steady-state, something that to the
best of our knowledge has not been done previously. It also makes it extremely easy to in-
vestigate the adjustment trajectories of when multiple shocks hit the economy at different
times.
In short, this framework opens a whole new realm of possibilities, being able to
cope with extremely complex and nonlinear dynamic systems, continuous or discrete, and
making it extremely easy to study expected and unexpected shocks, single or multiple. We
believe it will be an important asset in the toolkit of a macro-growth researcher.
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Figure 2.6: Impulse responses to an anticipated increase in τc at t = 20 for three distinct initial values for
k0. The straight blue line exhibits the adjustment trajectories for when the economy departs from steady
state, k0 = k∗. The red dashed line exhibits the very same trajectories for when the economy departs from
over its steady state value, k0 = 1.5k∗. Finally, the green dashed line shows the behavior from a starting
point of half its steady state value, k0 = 0.5k∗.
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Chapter 3
Optimal debt adjustment in a nonlinear
endogenous growth model
"If austerity is so terrible, how come Germany and Sweden have done so well?"
– Roberto Barro
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3.1 Introduction
In this work we study the optimal debt adjustment strategy in terms of the best policy to
conduct a fiscal consolidation, gauging its impact by estimating the welfare costs of the
transition back to a sustainable path. To do so, we construct an endogenous growth model
with public capital and government debt, time-varying tax rates, a controllable path of
public expenditure and a quantitative budget rule. Debt is issued at the domestic interest
rate in international capital markets for which the demand for bonds is unlimited, so we
ignore the effects of the risk premium on the yield-to-maturity of bonds. The model builds
on two related strands of literature: the literature on endogenous economic growth and the
literature on dynamic optimal taxation, but it parts ways with the traditional analysis by
(i) employing a framework that allows the nonlinear form of the model to be solved,
thereby escaping from the recurrent loglinearization inaccuracies; and (ii) introducing
time-variant tax rates, an assumption that renders the analytical models intractable and,
therefore, irresoluble. We are thus able to overcome this issue.
The work of Romer (1986) marked the revival of the literature on economic growth,
further reinforced by the seminal work of Lucas (1988). These models suggested that
distortions may affect the long-term rate of growth of income, consumption and accumu-
lation of capital. The recent sovereign debt crisis afflicting developed countries turned
this topic ever more significant. In fact, it led to the resurgence in the economic literature
of theoretical and empirical research trying to uncover if, how, and by how much can debt
tamper with growth, the optimal level of public debt and strategies to curb explosive debt
levels and bring it back to a safe trajectory. It is a response to the negative effects and
financial failure caused by the limited and sometimes prohibitive access to the interna-
tional capital markets, severely constraining how governments finance their expenditure
and outstanding debt obligations.
Following this strand of the literature, Maebayashi et al. (2012) examine how to
reduce the levels of debt down to a given target level. The results obtained suggest that
there exists multiple equilibria and that lower target levels for public debt will increase the
growth rate in the high-growth rate equilibrium. Minea and Villieu (2012) solve the model
by slightly altering how the log-linearization is done and the model exhibits a single path
to equilibrium, reverting some of the results previously obtained, although a negative link
between debt and growth is still present. This is not exclusive of the economic growth
literature. New-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models perform no
better. As soon as log-linearization is introduced, qualitative errors may occur, as a recent
discussion at a Federal Reserve Bank conference1 and the work of Braun et al. (2012)
137th Annual Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Fall Conference. October 2012.
http://research.stlouisfed.org/conferences/annual/index.html
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have shown.
The empirical literature has also not provided a definite answer on the subject. Re-
sults on the best way to reduce debt and on how debt can affect growth are ambivalent.
The work of Alesina and Ardagna (2009) imply a steady reduction in the level of public
expenditure that is growth-enacting and Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) warn that high levels
of debt might impede economic growth. At the opposite side, studies like Blanchard and
Leigh (2013) say that strong fiscal consolidations have a detrimental effect on growth due
to amplified fiscal multipliers in times of recession. The relationship between debt and
growth is key to adjusting fiscal consolidation, but it is still uncertain.
In such a context, we study the optimal fiscal consolidation policy that is able to invert
the ascending trajectory of public debt, while minimizing potential welfare costs, under
a new perspective. Building upon the numerical framework proposed by Amorim Lopes
et al. (2013) for solving infinite-horizon endogenous growth models, we do not an exoge-
nous budget nor a fiscal adjustment rule and thus the system finds the optimal adjustment
for the trajectory of the stock of public debt. This approach does not require fixing the
functional form of the budget rule, which otherwise would impose a pre-defined path for
the fiscal consolidation and subsequent debt adjustment. In lieu, the quantitative band
allows the system to operate freely in the search for an optimal solution. In this scenario,
where both lower and upper bounds are imposed on the budget deficit, the economy is able
to make use of the best fiscal policy available for a particular period and then revert it, if
convenient. For instance, this strategy would allow for a countercyclical macroeconomic
policy to be conducted, as long as it benefits the adjustment. Morever, this approach
allows to experiment with time-variant tax rates, bringing into play a dynamic fiscal
policy, an instrument that can be used to minimize the welfare adjustment costs of the
transitional dynamics or as an alternative scenario, to reinforce the investment in public
capital and debt service.
Our preliminary results are the following:
1. Like in other endogenous growth models, the optimal tax rate on capital income is
zero in the long-run. In the short-run, the optimal policy consists in taxing capital
and income, given that the supply of capital is inelastic in the short-term; in the
long-run, since capital income taxes discourage capital accumulation, there is a
shift in the tax policy and the tax revenues are now fully supported by a tax on
consumption, with the tax on capital and income converging to zero;
2. Government chooses to withhold investment in public capital in the first years of
the adjustment, suggesting a sharp expenditure cut. Investment in public capital is
resumed afterwards, converging again to its equilibrium trend. This suggests that an
optimal fiscal consolidation relies heavily on curbing the levels of public spending;
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3. The initial level of public debt will condition the adjustment trajectory. For low
levels of public debt, it is optimal to issue further public debt prior to proceed-
ing with a fiscal consolidation so as to keep taxes low and promote investment in
growth-enacting private capital. For high levels of public debt, adjustment com-
mences right away, at time zero. This suggests that the relationship between debt
and growth is non-monotonic with an inverted U-shape function. Our simulations
indicate the inflection point to be around 160 and 170 percent of the GDP;
4. For an horizon of thirty years, the larger the level of initial public debt, the lower
the short-run and long-run growth rate of the economy. The effects of high levels of
public debt are notorious and long-lasting. For a longer time window, the economies
converge to the same growth rate, but since the growth rates exhibited during the
transition are different, they converge necessarily to different equilibriums;
5. Although debt can promote a short-run surge in growth, unsustainable levels are
detrimental to the economy and take a long period to accommodate for. This sug-
gests that fiscal policy should be very careful of unsustainable debt levels and act
accordingly.
The remaining of this work is as follows. In Section 3.2 we review the existing literature,
provide an empirical background on public debt, explain fundamental concepts like those
of fiscal and debt sustainability and standard approaches to fiscal consolidation and debt
adjustment. In Section 3.3 we introduce the framework and the model under which we
will analyze the optimal adjustment of debt, along with the numerical results. Section 3.4
leaves some remarks to the policy maker, along with policy implications of the suggested
adjustment plan. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes with suggestions for future work.
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3.2 Background on public debt
In an economy where a government exists and provides public goods and services, mainly
in the form of investment in public capital, spurious government consumption and social
transfers through tax credits or outright subsidies, then any budget needs can be financed
in two distinct ways. Government either levies a tax mix on capital, labour and consump-
tion, or it resorts to debt financing instruments, issuing public debt in the form of treasury
bills and government bonds, therefore deferring immediate payment over a defined pe-
riod of time. In some countries, the holders of government debt owe a privileged drawing
right over the fiat reserves of the domestic currency held by the country or central bank.
Initially, the reserves used to be gold. With the advent of the fractional reserve banking
system, the amount of money in circulation has long surpassed the market value of the
available reserves of gold, and so it is a practice that no longer applies.
When government issues debt, it is committing to a payment of interest, along with a
redemption of the face value of the coupon at the date of maturity. Servicing debt adds an
extra burden to the government budget. If it can no longer abide by its debt obligations, it
is on a path of fiscal unsustainability that could eventually trigger a default notice, either
partial or in full, if a fiscal consolidation is not immediately undertaken. Such financial
stance can result in massive losses to the bondholders, prompting subsequent withdrawals
from the debt market, prices to plummet, yields to rise and, in the worst-case scenario,
making it impossible to issue further debt bonds in international capital markets due to a
falling demand. Facing the impossibility of issuing debt, the government would be unable
to run a fiscal deficit. In this scenario, where the government is then forced to run a
balanced budget, taxes would have to equal expenditure, pari passu. Fiscal policy would
have to immediately compel to this restriction, either by raising taxes or by reducing
public spending in a very sharp and sudden adjustment.
The financial advantage of issuing debt is to avoid the upfront payment of the amount
borrowed, which otherwise could take years of accumulated surpluses before a large and
potentially beneficial investment could take place. This way, payments can be split over a
period of several years, benefiting from the potential increase in economic growth brought
forward by a strategic investment in productive public investment. In the particular case
of public debt, it may also serve a morality principle. Since investment in public capital
will be used by future generations, it may be argued that they also must share the burden.
The contrary may also apply: present generations may use debt as a way to postpone their
financial obligations and charge them to future generations. The struggle for a balanced
sharing of the costs is of extreme interest, although outside the scope of this work. If debt
has no productive use, it may have no effect on growth. In fact, since interest has to be paid
on debt and taxes may have to be raised in order to do so, it could be adverse to economic
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growth. These cases expose a potential link between public debt and growth, and such
relationship is the core of the discussion on how much debt should the government be
allowed to pile up.
In the next sections we will look at some empirical data showing how governments
have been issuing debt, rooting some of the causes of the sovereign debt crisis; in addi-
tion, we will provide a brief overview of the components of the government budget, the
inter-temporal constraint on the budget, sustainable and unsustainable fiscal policies; fur-
thermore, the relationship between debt and growth is also studied and an overview of the
last developments in the literature is given.
3.2.1 Empirical data
Historically, massive debt issuance programs have been associated with wars. In order to
finance a surge in military spending, governments would issue bonds and sell them at face
or discount value redeemable at a specified maturity. Looking at the long-term data series
of public debt issued in the USA, depicted in Figure 3.1, it can be seen that the largest
bond programs took place prior to the World War I and II, and have been declining ever
since, at least up until the 80s. The Great Depression, although not a war, was also a time
of great financing needs in order to support the New Deal Act — a program of public
works of unprecedented scale — put forward by President Franklin D. Roosevelt2.
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Figure 1.
Federal Debt Held by the Public, 1790 to 2035
(Percentage of gross domestic product)
Source: Congressional Budget Office, The Long-Term Budget Outlook (June 2010); Historical Data on Federal Debt Held by the Public 
(July 2010).
Note: The extended-baseline scenario adheres closely to current law, following CBO’s 10-year baseline budget projections through 2020 
(with adjustments for the recently enacted health care legislation) and then extending the baseline concept for the rest of the long-
term projection period. The alternative fiscal scenario incorporates several changes to current law that are widely expected to occur or 
that would modify some provisions that might be difficult to sustain for a long period.
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2. The size of a country’s economy provides a measure of its ability to 
pay interest on government debt, in the same way that a family’s 
income helps to determine the amount of mortgage interest that it 
can afford. Federal debt has two main components: debt held by 
the public, and debt held by government trust funds and other 
government accounts. This issue brief focuses on the former as the 
most meaningful measure for assessing the relationship between 
federal debt and the economy. Debt held by the public represents 
the amount that the government has borrowed in financial 
markets to pay for its operations and activities; in pursuing such 
borrowing, the government competes with other participants in 
credit markets for financial resources. In contrast, debt held by 
government trust funds and other government accounts represents 
internal transactions of the government.
3. For details about the assumptions underlying the scenarios, see 
Congressional Budget Office, The Long-Term Budget Outlook 
(June 2010), Table 1-1. 
Figure 3.1: Public debt-to-GDP ratio of the United States of America, 1790-2010. Simulation for the path
of the public debt-to-GDP until 2030. Source: CBO - Congressional Budget Office, Figure 1 of "Federal
Debt and the Risk f a Fiscal Crisis", July 27 2010.
Over the years that followed the end of w time, the debt-to-GDP ratio starte to
2For an unorthodox perspective on how the New De l might have delay d by 7 years the economic
recovery of the USA, see Cole and Ohanian (2004).
46
CHAPTER 3. OPTIMAL DEBT ADJUSTMENT IN AN ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL
decline. Aizenman and Marion (2011) point to a putative effect of both inflation and
an expanding economy driving down the debt-to-GDP ratio. Growth, on the one hand,
increases tax receipts and reduces the budget deficit. Inflation, on the other hand, depre-
ciates the real value of debt, acting as a transfer from lenders to borrowers. In the case of
government debt, inflation delivers a transfer from the bondholders to the state.
In the last couple of decades public debt has been accumulating again, despite no
particular upsurge in government military spending. The situation has had a major impact
in Europe, leading to a large sovereign debt crisis afflicting several countries like Greece,
Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus, and probably causing a slow down of the growth rate of the
remaining European Monetary Union (EMU) constituents. The response of the European
Central Bank, the European Commission and the IMF comprised of bail out packages to
Portugal, Ireland and Greece, a debt haircut to bondholders of the greek public debt and
a bail in in the case of Cyprus, imposing an overnight tax on all savings accounts above a
certain threshold.
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Figure 3.2: Public debt-to-GDP ratio of some of the countries recently afflicted by the sovereign debt crisis,
along with the EU average. 2001-2012. Source: Eurostat, General government gross debt - annual data, 26
July 2013.
Figure 3.2 highlights the recent trajectories of the public debt-to-GDP ratios of some
of the countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis, along with an average for the European
Union. As the picture shows, the debt-to-GDP ratio aggravated after the latest financial
crisis, exhibiting a sharp upward trend in the middle of 2010, after two years of extremely
large fiscal deficits. For the year of 2010, Ireland recorded an all-time high budget deficit
of 30.8% of the GDP. This happened as a result of the governmental injection of capital
into its domestic banks.
The Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact establish a ceiling for the
level of public debt, fixed at 60% of the GDP. However, countries like Portugal and Greece
had long surpassed that limit before the crisis hit, with Greece exhibiting levels of debt
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over 100% of the GDP when it joined the Euro.
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Figure 3.3: Level of the Portuguese public debt between the period of 1999-2012, measured in thousands
of million Euros. Source: Agência da Gestão e da Tesouraria da Dívida Pública, annual series; Banco de
Portugal, GDP deflator, annual series. Author calculations for the inflation-adjusted level of public debt.
Nonetheless, as Figure 3.3 shows, the financial crisis that started in 2007 was not the
only culprit. For instance, in absolute levels and adjusting for inflation, the level of the
Portuguese sovereign debt increased twofold between 2004 and 2011, jumping from 85
959 million Euros to 168 341 million Euros (constant prices). Also, public debt has been
growing at positive yearly rates between 2% and 16% for the last decade.
Rising debt levels and soaring interest rates on bonds have again raised the red flag.
The financial burden generated by the high levels of public debt might severely harm the
growth rate of the economy, as it significantly raises the amount of money required to
service it. Furthermore, and as it can be seen in Section 3.2.4.1, the unsustainability of
the public finances of a country automatically increases the implicit and perceived risk
of default, thereby increasing the risk premium demanded by investors. Such effects add
further financial strain to an already precarious situation.
Figure 3.4 is revelatory of the upcoming financial effort that is required to service
the outstanding public debt of Portugal, one of the countries currently under a bail out
program. Assuming an inflation of pi = 1.5% and a growth rate of γ = 1.5% per year and
using the GDP in 2012 as the base year, the costs of servicing debt in the years of 2016
and 2021 will consume a considerable fraction of the GDP, up to 10%. Considering that
a significant part of this debt is held by foreign investors and institutional creditors, as
can be seen by the decomposition of the redemptions, a significant and critical amount
of the output produced will be towards paying debt obligations, with money leaving the
domestic economy.
Three signs indicate that the aforementioned combination of inflation and growth
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observed in the past may not again be an option to tackle the current public debt-to-GDP
ratios observed in these European countries. Firstly, independent central banks, like the
ECB, follow a strict inflation-targeting policy, ensuring that inflation, measured by the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) or any other price level index, is kept at low values, be-
low the 2% threshold. In addition, in order to attract more investors, governments have
been issuing bonds that are indexed to inflation and Figure 3.5 highlights the upward
trend in the demand for U.S. Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS). Secondly,
the growth trend has been declining in most of the developed countries, exhibiting pos-
itive yet decreasing rates over the last decades. For the particular case of Portugal, it is
interesting to observe a substantial declining of the growth rate of the economy, especially
during the last decade. Figure 3.6 shows the percentage change in growth, year over year,
from 1961 to 2011; a simple linear statistical regression shows a clear downward trend.
Thirdly, nominal interest rates are close to their zero lower bound (ZLB), implying that
expansive monetary policies to boost investment and reduce unemployment are spurious.
This counter-cyclical monetary policy is an instrument used by central banks to boost
aggregate demand in the short-run and generate a temporary surge in the output of the
economy. The recovery of the economy would automatically help with the adjustment of
the public debt, directly by raising the tax revenues and reducing deficits and, indirectly,
by increasing the denominator of the debt-to-GDP ratio, the nominal GDP. Furthermore,
the European countries that are members of the EMU gave up the monetary instruments
able to foster aggregate demand and the GDP and, thus, reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio.
49
CHAPTER 3. OPTIMAL DEBT ADJUSTMENT IN AN ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
1996! 1997! 1998! 1999! 2000! 2001! 2002 ! 2003 ! 2004 ! 2005 ! 2006 ! 2007 ! 2008! 2009 ! 2010 ! 2011!
TIPS (% Public debt)
Figure 3.5: Share of the public debt of the USA held in Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS).
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Considering the low growth rate and stable inflation trends registered for the Por-
tuguese economy and also observable in other developed countries, reducing the level of
public debt will require resorting to a fiscal consolidation by raising taxes, decreasing
public expenditure or a mix of both. Section 3.2.4 briefly discusses other available ap-
proaches that fall under the domain of political economy to curb down debt. The next
sections expose the theoretical underpinnings of the dynamics of the stock of public debt.
3.2.2 Debt and growth
Academics, and non-academics alike, have recently witnessed an upsurge in the debate
over the effects of public debt on economic growth. Such intensified discussion has also
unleashed a considerable amount of theoretical and empirical literature trying to find a
causal relationship between these two facets of a dynamic economy. In fact, such question
is of the utmost importance due to its indirect effects on the fiscal sustainability of public
finances and, consequently, on the general welfare of society.
Establishing an implicit relationship between debt and growth is quintessential for
ascribing a proper strategy to curb the trajectory of debt. In the neoclassical growth model,
the functional form of the endogenous variables that are responsible for economic growth
is neutral towards debt. This results from the fact that in a closed economy all assets are
held by families, comprised either of private capital or public debt, and so servicing debt
in fact reverts back to the economy in the form of new investment in productive capital
or welfare-maximizing consumption. Consider, for instance, Maebayashi et al. (2012).
Taking out the fiscal policy rule, debt can grow indefinitely without having a direct effect
50
CHAPTER 3. OPTIMAL DEBT ADJUSTMENT IN AN ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
1961! 1971! 1981 ! 1991! 2001! 2011 !
Gr
ow
th
 R
at
e
Year
GDP Growth Rate
GDP Growth Rate
GDP Trend
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2012. Source: PORDATA.
on the accumulation of capital. Only when a policy rule binding the budget surplus/deficit
and public debt is chosen, does debt start affecting growth by the taxes channel. In a world
characterized by open economies, international capital markets, free flows of capital and
risk premia on sovereign default, such models fall short on fully depicting how the capital
markets react to ever-mounting increases in debt, and so a fiscal feedback rule is necessary
to define how fiscal policy should react to a variation in the stock of public debt and to
enforce that the government remains solvent.
Four possible causal relationships from debt to growth can be put forth a priori:
1. Debt is neutral. It has no effect on the growth rate of the economy, neither increas-
ing or decreasing it;
2. Debt has a positive effect on growth. It allows public investment in infrastructure
to take place, leading, in turn, to positive externalities in the production sector. The
financial burden caused by borrowing is offset by the ever increasing tax revenues
made possible by the effect;
3. Debt has a negative effect on growth. This one is probably the most worrisome
possibility as public debt may lead to lower growth rates and an unsustainable fiscal
stance due to rampant interest rates, a situation usually seized with fiscal austerity,
inflation or default3. In this scenario, public debt is probably not being put to serve
productive investment but rather spurious consumption;
4. Debt can feature all of the above at different points in time. This is a feature aris-
ing from a likely nonlinear, U-shaped relationship between public debt and growth,
3Cochrane (2011) provides an interesting discussion of the short and long-term consequences of inflation
and how it could lead to a run on the currency.
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expressed as a non-monotonic connection between variables. Such scenario would
considerably encumber the task of figuring out the connection, if any, between pub-
lic debt and economic growth.
The question remains. What is the effect of public debt on growth?
3.2.2.1 Mathematical analysis
At this time, it might be useful to proceed with a strictly aprioristic analysis of the prob-
lem, laying down the core concepts before conjecturing a causal link. From a purely
mathematical perspective, this is a standard case of a relative change. If a given variable
decreases at rate α , it will have to grow at a rate equal to γ = 1/(1−α) to go back to its
original level. It is immediate to see that for α ∈ [0,1), then γ > α for the case of linear
growth, which can be assumed to be the case over the cycle. This effect is present in the
mathematical relationship between public debt and output. Public debt can be approxi-
mated by α and the growth rate of the output by γ .
To see the impact of this property, consider an economy producing 100 units of goods
at time t, that is, Yt = 100. Suppose that servicing debt costs the equivalent to 7.5% of
the aggregate output, such that rB = 7.5. If the markets equilibrate in a closed economy,
assets held by families are either capital or bonds, so the servicing of debt for a given tax
rate does not affect the level of aggregate demand as bonds can easily be converted into
new investment in private capital. Let us neglect that for a moment and assume that debt
is only held by international investors, implying that its payment will in fact reduce the
size of the national output by rB units.
In order to ensure that the output level remains constant, i.e. Yt+2 = Yt , the econ-
omy at time t + 1 needs to grow enough to offset the debt service. Output growth is
assumed to be exponential but since we are dealing with a short period of time we can
approximate it to a linear form without much loss of generality. So, the growth rate γ
will have to be equivalent to Yt = Yt+2 = γYt+1. Solving with respect to γ we obtain
γ = Yt/Yt+1 = 100/92.5 = 1.081 that implies a growth rate of 8.1%, higher than the per-
centage of resources that was taken out of the economy (7.5%). Holding everything else
constant and ignoring all the other interactions within the economy, we can generalize this
result by saying that if rB/Y is reduced from the economy, the growth rate γ that puts it
back at the original level is larger than the debt service to GDP ratio rB/Y by the amount
γ ′− γ , with γ ′ = 1/(1− γ).
The above line of reasoning is necessarily true if, as previously mentioned, the prob-
lem is reduced to the exploitation of the mathematical properties of the variables. In-
corporating economic evidence like the positive and significant effect of public capital
inputs in the private sector output or the possibility of bonds being held by domestic
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investors would draw the quantitative conclusion less meaningful. Servicing debt to do-
mestic bondholders eases the budget constraint of families, allowing them to reinvest in
capital or consume, which could boost growth by itself. Despite the fact that incorporating
such economic properties might invalidate the conclusion, it does not render the exercise
just conducted useless. Notice that servicing debt is at odds with growth since it can po-
tentially drain resources from the domestic economy, and if that is not the case, it has to
be offset by a mechanism capable of compensating for the differential. Thus, if a relation
exists, it has to be stronger than the a priori assumption that γ > rB/Y . Economically,
this means that the marginal productivity of debt has to be high enough to compensate for
the yield necessary to service its costs.
3.2.2.2 Theoretical and empirical evidence
The unfolding of a paper by Thomas Herndon (2013), rebutting the evidence found by
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) that pointed to a negative effect of public debt on growth when
a 90% threshold of the public debt to GDP ratio is surpassed, generated a huge turmoil in
the academic community. According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), data shows a steady
negative correlation between debt and growth and a sharp drop of the mean growth rate
from 3% to -0.1% as the 90% threshold is attained. The critique does not go against the
negative connection found between debt and growth but rather against the conclusion that
a sudden jolt to growth takes place as the 90% line is crossed. They find a much smoother
decrease from 3% to 2.2% in the mean growth rates, as depicted in Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7: Empirical evidence on growth and the debt-to-GDP ratio obtained by Reinhart and Rogoff
(2010) (RR) and the revised calculations by Thomas Herndon (2013) (HH).
It is outside the scope of this work to cover the full extent of the discussion, but it is
certainly insightful to shed a light on the topic. Literature is mixed. From an empirical
standpoint, the work of the IMF economists Kumar and Woo (2010) points to a stance
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similar to that of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). They observe a negative relationship be-
tween public debt and growth and quantitatively they find a decrease in 0.2% in the rate of
growth for each increase of 10% in the pre-existing level of public debt. Furthermore, they
find an alarming nonlinearity for high levels of public debt, which could be responsible
for a disproportionate effect on the subsequent growth.
The economists Cecchetti et al. (2011) at the Bank for International Settlements
reached a similar conclusion. Their results suggest that public debt plays a very nega-
tive effect on growth for levels over 85% of the debt-to-GDP ratio. For such cases, the
recommended policy would be to act rapidly and decisively, which can be translated from
the policy jargon as performing an abrupt (“cold-turkey”) fiscal consolidation. This very
same conclusion is also shared by Baum et al. (2012) at the European Central Bank. Their
empirical results find a pattern very similar to that widely reported in the literature. The
short-run impact of small levels of public debt of up to 67% of the debt-to-GDP ratio is
positive and statistically significant, exhibiting a detrimental effect on growth for levels
over 95% of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Moreover, they also find a link between debt-to-GDP
ratios above 70% and the surge in the risk premium demanded by potential bondholders.
Panizza and Presbitero (2013) take a more holistic approach and review the whole
body of literature covering the connection between public debt and growth. They find
ambiguous answers in the theoretical literature and so they resort mainly to the empirical
evidence. Their conclusion is that although several studies suggest a negative correlation
between public debt and growth, none of them makes a clear case for a causal relationship
from debt to economic growth. They also find out that the existence of thresholds and a
non-monotonic relationship between debt and growth is not robust to small changes, and
therefore conditions the results obtained.
The property of being monotonic implies that a positive link between debt and growth
cannot suddenly turn into a negative relationship, and vice-versa. The problem can be re-
stated as follows: does an inverse U-shaped functional form exist between public debt
and growth? Greiner (2012) puts the hypothesis to the test under a framework of an en-
dogenous growth model with public capital and public debt. According to the theoretical
model, the non-monotonic relation only holds for the particular case of exogenously fixed
public deficits to equate the public investment at each point in time. The corollary of such
result is that under a more general debt policy, a negative monotonic relation between
debt and growth exists, implying that increasing levels of debt-to-GDP cause a decrease
in the long-term growth rate.
Some other recent studies like IMF (2012) are in line with the conclusions reached
by Panizza and Presbitero (2013). Their results seem to indicate that no clear threshold
for the debt-to-GDP ratio exists, although their policy implications do not refrain from the
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need of a fiscal adjustment to preclude further debt overhang. The juxtaposition of that
suggestion comes in the form of a recent review by Reinhart et al. (2012) of their previous
study (cf. Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010), incorporating updated evidence and focusing on
the above 90% threshold debt-to-GDP ratio, again reiterating a clear negative connection
between high ratios and a lower or negative economic growth rate.
Notwithstanding, the conundrum still remains. Reaching a conclusion would help
in establishing the optimal set of policies for adjusting the levels of public debt. Since
no final answer has been attained yet, this work focuses on the reduction of the levels
of public debt and in finding optimal adjustment policies to accomplish it. We follow
this approach given the recent sovereign debt crisis triggered by ever-increasing levels
of public debt. The next sections cover the theoretical and empirical aspects of fiscal
consolidations and, then, concentrate on how debt adjustment usually takes place before
introducing an optimal debt adjustment policy under a framework of endogenous growth.
3.2.3 Debt dynamics
The overview of how public debt evolved over time provided previously exposes the dy-
namic nature of public debt. Likewise with other stock variables, public debt increases
with positive flows, decreases with negative flows, and depreciates with inflation.
Although the law of motion for the stock of public debt may be easy to understand
in terms of positive and negative flows, the functional relationship between variables, if
any, — i.e., how and to which extent the variation of one variable affects the others — is
not, and it is still subject to great dispute amongst economists. Therefore, an extensive
introduction to debt dynamics is required. We will provide a mathematical introduction
to the time-dependent equation of public debt and consult the literature for theories ex-
trapolating links between variables.
Governments usually levy taxes capital, labor, and consumption, although it can also
obtain a stipend from some other form of indirect taxation, like on alcohol, tobacco, oil,
gas emissions, customs, financial transactions, property taxes, etc. Taxation is raised in
order to finance public expenditure, G, which can be decomposed in public investment,
Ig, public consumption, Cg, and social transfers, Cs. For simplicity, we assume the tax
revenue to be a share of the output of the economy, T = τY . We can then extract the
primary balance accounting identity, PB. It is the difference between tax revenues and
public expenditure.
PB = T −G = τY − Ig−Cg−Cs. (3.1)
When PB > 0, the government exhibits a primary surplus, meaning that tax revenues are
in excess of public spending. For PB < 0, the opposite occurs and the government is
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facing a fiscal deficit. The government is said to run a balanced budget when revenues
equal public expenditure (PB = 0).
When the government faces a fiscal deficit (PB < 0), the differential has to be fi-
nanced by offering government bonds, B, in an amount of no less than PB. In order for
investors to be interested in holding assets not as liquid as paper money, bonds pay a fixed
interest rate, rB, on its face value, i.e., the initial selling price. Since capital is usually
taxed, earnings from bonds are no exemption, the government earns an additional τrB at
each period. The following accounting identity describes the law of motion of the stock
of public debt:
B˙ = rB− τrB− τY + Ig+Cg+Cs+SFA, (3.2)
where SFA stands for the stock-flow adjustment variable, i.e., the statistical increase in
debt that is not explained by direct budget deficits, which in theory should be zero. The
identity given by Equation (3.2) can be rearranged in order to obtain the dynamic budget
constraint on the government:
B˙ = rB(1− τ)−PB. (3.3)
Note that we are assuming a closed economy and therefore all interest paid remains in
the economy. No spill outs occur. Under such circumstances, when debt is solely held
by domestic investors, no resources drain out of the economy, but this may not always
be the case. In fact, this is not the only factor that may constrain how public financing
is conducted. Driscoll (2003) covers some of the issues a government may face. They
include i) the need to remain solvent; ii) the distortionary effect of taxes on the supply-
side and on tax evasion; iii) time lags arising from delays in implementing policies; iv)
credibility problems from time-inconsistency of announced policies and v) limitations
imposed by political or legal boundaries.
Equation (3.3) is the book-keeping identity that governs public finances. If B˙ > 0,
the government is issuing bonds, adding to the stock of public debt. On the other hand,
if B˙ < 0, the government has a budget surplus and is thus able to reduce the amount of
public debt in circulation.
In order to fully assess the dynamics of public debt another fundamental variable, the
gross domestic product (GDP), must be included. Indeed, how the output evolves affects
all variables of the book-keeping relation identified in Equation (3.3). Tax revenues are
raised by the growth of output (recall that T = τY ), contributing to an automatic decrease
of the public deficit, −PB, when everything else is held constant. To do so, we derivate
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b (≡ B/Y ) with respect to time and replace accordingly in Equation (3.3) to obtain:
b˙ = d+(r− γ)b, (3.4)
where d is the ratio of the primary balance to the GDP and γ is the GDP growth rate.
Looking at Equation (3.4) and assuming the real interest rate, two particular cases
stand out when evaluating the path of the public debt:
r > γ: when the real interest rate exceeds the real growth rate of the economy then b→∞
when t → ∞. Debt is labelled as explosive once, even with a balanced primary
budget, the debt-to-GDP ratio rises endogenously due to debt servicing (“snow-
ball” effect). In practice, investors realize that the government is running insolvent
and so no longer buy treasury bonds, eventually reselling them in the secondary
market, causing prices to plunge and the market interest rates to rise, which only
further aggravates the problem. Ignoring the scenario of seignorage (i.e., paying for
bonds with high powered money creation), the government may default, raises taxes
T and/or decreases public expenditure G in order to bring debt back to a sustainable
position;
r ≤ γ: in this case, accumulated debt pays itself and, given G, fiscal deficits converge to
balanced budgets to the ever-increasing tax revenues. If so, b→ 0 when t→∞. For
the particular case that the interest rate equals the growth rate, r = γ , then b = b0
for all t ≥ 0. Under such circumstances, the government continues solvent for the
times to come and debt is on a sustainable path, i.e., obeying the intertemporal
budget constraint.
By considering the Fisher equation (r = i−pi) and substitute in Equation (3.4) we obtain
the differential equation that also takes into account the effect of nominal inflation
b˙ = d+(i−pi− γ)b. (3.5)
How the interaction between inflation and the stock of public debt occurs will depend
on several factors. If public debt bonds are indexed to inflation as with TIPS, when nom-
inal interest rates rise either through inflation or by increases in the real interest rate, debt
servicing costs expand, which are positive flows in the equation of public debt, thereby
adding to it. If, on the contrary, bonds are not indexed to inflation, this monetary effect
will depreciate the real value of money, making it easier to pay for the outstanding debt
obligations. When government or the central bank purportedly increase the growth rate of
the money supply in order to cause a rise in inflation, it is attempting at the monetization
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of debt, reducing the real value of its financial commitments. This process is only pos-
sible when bonds are issued in the domestic currency, which sometimes is not the case,
especially for countries with fragile domestic currencies or an history of currency deval-
uations. Seignorage (inflation through high-powered money creation) can be, as a matter
of fact, a strategy for debt adjustment, although at the expense of outstanding creditors
(an “inflation tax” on bondholders).
3.2.3.1 Intertemporal budget constraint
Since all borrowed debt needs to be paid, a government intertemporal budget constraint
must be imposed. It requires the present value of government expenditure to equal the
present value of taxation. Simplifying to a discrete, 2-period framework, it means that the
following must held and thus,
G1+
G2
1+ r
= T1+
T2
1+ r
. (3.6)
The 2-period budget constraint from Equation (3.6) can be translated into a continuous
infinite-horizon version:
B(0) =
∞ˆ
0
e−
´ µ
0 (1−τ)r(ν)dνS(µ)dµ ↔ lim
t→∞e
−´ t0(1−τ)r(µ)dµB(t) = 0 (3.7)
In practice, one way of ensuring that the intertemporal budget constraint is verified is
by defining a fiscal policy rule, i.e., a public finance rule of thumb that sets a particular
feedback function on the government budget as a response to changes in the public debt.
3.2.4 Debt adjustment
Equation (3.5) contains all the flows and variables that can change the stock of public debt
and so it is a good starting point for drawing strategies to surmount alarming levels of
public debt. As previously seen, the stock of public debt increases with flows of primary
budget deficits, d, and with nominal debt costs, rb. The real interest rate, r, increases
the financial burden of servicing debt, and inflation, pi , can either help or hinder how
these flows vary, playing a dual role. Growth exhibits a less ambiguous effect as it is
always beneficial insofar as it increases tax revenues, therefore helping with balancing
the government budget. At the same time, it increases the denominator of the debt-to-
GDP ratio. Less clear is, as we have seen, how debt may affect growth.
Improving the fiscal budget so as to reduce deficits or promote surpluses is termed
fiscal consolidation. That deals with the primary budget, d, and is one instrument of public
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finance for reducing the level of public debt. Whether to increase taxes or cut government
spending is a choice concerning economic policy. We can divide the available strategies
for adjusting public debt into two separate strands of the literature, economic theory and
political economy. Under the umbrella of economic theory fall the monetary and fiscal
policies aimed at putting the economy back on a sustainable path. They work by either
proceeding with a fiscal consolidation, monetizing debt through inflation or promoting
growth-enacting policies. Other strategies like negotiating a partial or a full default of
the outstanding debt, trying to reach a debt relief or coming to terms on longer maturities
along with reduced interest rates concerns the domain of political economy. They are not
exclusive. In certain cases where it is no longer financially possible to recover from a
debt overhang, reaching an agreement on a debt haircut or debt pardon may be the only
option available, although it may come at considerable economic and reputation costs
(Borensztein and Panizza, 2008).
Although monetizing debt, pushing for a higher growth rate or negotiating reduced
interest rates may be valid ways of reducing debt, they are instruments not under the direct
control of governments. Countries that joined a monetary union under a fixed exchange-
rate between members, like the EMU, no longer control monetary policies capable of
generating inflation, and they are severely limited in using expansionary fiscal policies
due to financial constraints. Moreover, modern central banks conduct inflation-targeting
policies, keeping tight supervision of variations in the price-level indexes. This severely
restricts the use of policies that rely on inflation to reduce debt-to-GDP ratios. As for
economic growth, structural reforms usually take years to bear fruit and depend on so
many political factors that the degree of control a government exerts over growth rates is
also severely limited. Moreover, it does not tackle the most immediate needs of an out
of control budget. Likewise, negotiating changes in interest rates or the maturity of the
contracts with the bondholders is also a complex and not fully controllable task and so it
cannot be used as a long-lasting and reliable instrument for adjusting debt.
Another valid strategy consists in promoting economic growth by performing struc-
tural reforms and other growth-enacting policies. But, as we have Seen in section 3.2.2,
the theory of how debt affects growth is far from settled. In fact, the relationship between
debt and growth can be even more puzzling than the relationship between debt and infla-
tion, so far making it very difficult to sketch a debt adjustment program solely focused
in promoting economic growth. Evidence is clear in showing that the growth rate of the
economies is not constant (see Figure 3.6). Fluctuations have been consistently observed
in the growth rate, an empirical fact that by itself invalidates the conjecture of a monotonic
and always positive constant growth rate, although the secular trendline appears to be so.
Reducing the costs of servicing debt by either defaulting partly or in full, or by rene-
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gotiating the interest rates and maturities, is also possible. Defaulting on debt and rene-
gotiating is under the domain of political economy. As for the interest rate demanded by
the bondholders, despite being usually set by the government in the initial offering, it is
benchmarked against the yield-to-maturity obtained in the secondary markets, which is
subject to the law of supply and demand. This implies that besides not being constant,
the interest rate is also not solely under the direct influence of governments. Some of the
factors that might influence the yield required by rational investors when buying assets
include variations in wealth, expectations about the future interest rate or future inflation
and a preference for liquidity4, all of them applying to some extent to the particular case
of public debt bonds. The one factor that is paramount to our analysis is that of the risk
premium. The riskier the prospect, the higher the expected return demanded by investors
will be in order to compensate for a potential loss. Uneven and increasing levels of debt
may lead to an unsustainable position, where servicing debt would be unattainable and
could cause a depletion of the whole of the economy if carried on.
Considering this, the objective of adjusting public debt in the short-run can only
consistently rely on controllable instruments like that of fiscal policy. Following this
rationale, adjustment and assistance programmes like those promoted by the IMF usually
depend on structural reforms to promote a higher long-run growth rate, but require short-
run fiscal consolidation to reduce budget deficits by tapering public consumption or public
investment and/or by increasing tax rates.
The present work abstains from considerations and strategies pertaining to political
economy, and so the scope is restricted to economic policies. Moreover, by focusing
on countries belonging to a monetary union, like the EMU countries which no longer
possess the ability to decide on matters of monetary policy, the study is further limited to
the optimal fiscal consolidation policy, which we will consider for the remainder of this
work.
3.2.4.1 Fiscal sustainability
Let us consider the following definition of fiscal sustainability.
Definition 1. For an initial level of public debt B(0), considering the expected growth
rate Et(γ) and the expected interest rate Et(r) and a given model of the economy M, the
fiscal policy M(G(·), T (·)) is sustainable if the government remains solvent.
This definition is the requisite to ensure that debt is sustainable and can be evaluated
in a simple question: is the debt-to-GDP ratio compatible with the government’s intertem-
4For a more extensive reference of factors influencing interest rates, check Mishkin (2007).
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poral budget constraint? If sustainable fiscal policies are to be pursued then debt remains
under control and will not reach exploding levels.
How fiscal deficits may affect fiscal sustainability is better grasped with the following
example. If it is assumed that the interest rate r, the growth rate of the economy γ and the
budget deficit d are constant, the the debt trajectory can be obtained by solving the linear
differential equation (3.4):
b(t) =
d
γ− r +
b0(γ− r)−d
γ− r · e
(r−γ)t . (3.8)
From Equation (3.8) it can be seen that perpetual budget deficits do not necessarily lead to
fiscal problems, as long as γ− r is large enough to offset deficit d. Unfortunately, neither
the growth rate nor the interest rate are constant, so such budget rule cannot be binding.
On top of that, the government has no direct control over these two variables, which can
suddenly vary. Hence, if for a given period r > γ is observed then the only way of bringing
debt back to a sustainable trajectory is by conducting a fiscal consolidation.
By using Definition 1 along with Equation (3.8) it can inferred that the yearly gov-
ernment budget has to be adjusted in order to compensate for deviations in the interest
rate r and in the growth rate γ . Note that, the adjustment does not have to occur in every
period if in the long run the dynamics remain sustainable, but the longer it takes to adjust,
the steeper the fiscal consolidation has to be.
Any given optimal debt adjustment strategy has to attend to Definition 1 to ensure
that in the terminal time the economy is in a fiscal sustainable state.
3.2.4.2 Debt sustainability
Building on the Definition 3.2.4.1, we can define sustainable debt as a situation where
the debt-to-GDP ratio stays constant or decreases and, thus, debt grows at a rate lower or
equal to the output of the economy.
Definition 2. Public debt is sustainable if the growth rate of level of public debt, B˙B = γB,
is less than or equal to the growth rate of the economy Y˙Y = γ , such that γ = γB or γ > γB
, which implies that the debt-to-GDP ratio either stays constant or decreases.
Without surprise, the definition of public debt depends on the previous definition of
fiscal sustainability (see Definition 1). Since fiscal policies command the growth rate of
the level of public debt. Following the dynamics of the public debt in Equation (3.4), in
order for b˙ < 0 to hold, it implies that
b≤ −d
r− γ ⇔
B
Y
≤ S/Y
r− γ . (3.9)
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Equation (3.9) states that in order for debt to be sustainable, the debt-to-GDP ratio, b ≡
B/Y , must be less than or equal to the ratio of the primary budget surplus, S/Y , divided
by the interest rate minus the growth rate of the economy, r− γ . This means that the
debt-to-GDP ratio has to grow at a rate inferior to the absolute value of the budget when
detrended of the interest rate of the growth of the economy.
3.2.4.3 Fiscal consolidation
Fiscal consolidation consists in reducing the underlying fiscal deficit of a government,
thus decreasing or inverting the positive flow effect that the budget deficit plays on the
evolution of public debt. Like with all other economic problems, the way variables are
interconnected may completely alter how, when or if fiscal consolidation should be con-
ducted.
Equation (3.4), that describes the law of motion of the stock of public debt, exposes
one particular scenario where no fiscal consolidation would be required, from a strictly
financial perspective: that of the exponential and continuous growth of the economy,
capable of mitigating the costs of servicing debt and paying off primary deficits. That
is, when the growth rate is higher than the real interest rate and enough to offset fiscal
deficits.
This is seldom the case, so an optimal strategy for conducting fiscal consolidation is
required in order to adjust the levels of public debt. Mauro et al. (2009) also find strong
evidence pointing in that direction: since higher public debt raises solvency risks and in-
creases the borrowing costs, fiscal consolidation is necessary to curtail the negative effect
of budget deficits and government debt levels on the interest rates. It is then quintessential
to analyze not only how to keep the public finances in a sustainable path but also how to
bring them back into track when adverse negative shocks or misadjusted policies force
them out of a sane trajectory. Failure to do so can eventually lead the country to extreme
austerity, inflation, or the possibility of a sovereign default.
Like the effect of debt on growth (see Section 3.2.2.2), the theory of optimal fiscal
policy, either when conducting fiscal stimuli or doing fiscal adjustment, is also surrounded
by much controversy. The study by Alesina and Ardagna (2009) probably is one of the
most cited studies when referring to the dispute of whether fiscal consolidation can be
expansionary, or not. When implementing fiscal stimuli, they are bold in advising for
tax cuts instead of spending increases. As for the subject at hand, fiscal consolidation,
they conclude that adjustments based upon spending cuts instead of tax raises are more
effective at reducing the levels of public debt and curbing deficits. Moreover, they also
state that an adjustment based on spending cuts might not have recessionary effects due
to crowding-in effects.
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The work of Baldacci et al. (2010) seemed to point in a similar direction. They
found that successful fiscal consolidations obtained mainly by reductions in the public
expenditure, along with structural reforms aimed at promoting growth and a supportive
monetary policy, when available. Notwithstanding, they also find benefit from increasing
tax rates for those countries in need of large fiscal adjustments. According to the Euro-
pean Comission (2007), expenditure cuts are more effective, as they are usually followed
by reforms that improve the public services’ efficiency, reducing squander of taxpayers
money. In contrast, Leigh et al. (2007) warn that increasing taxes may postpone structural
reforms, signaling a weak commitment to proceed with such endeavor. As a matter of
fact, consistent resemblances can be found between this research paper and the practical
implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) undersigned by the Por-
tuguese government and the members of the Troika (ECB, EC and the IMF). The first two
years consisted fundamentally of raising taxes, with no notorious and significant structural
reforms undertaken, other than a change to the rigidity of the labour market legislation.
More recently, IMF economists have retreated from their initial stance. Blanchard and
Leigh (2013) present the case of larger fiscal multipliers that increase the negative effect
of the fiscal adjustment on the output growth. This view is also shared by Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2010), confirming that fiscal multipliers tend to be larger when in times
of recession. If that is effectively true, fiscal consolidation is not expansionary and could
potentially be self-defeating, contributing to an increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio through
a reduction of the GDP denominator. Another cause for such effect is the phenomenon
of hysteresis, an hypothesis put forward by DeLong and Summers (2012). The analysis
is conducted under a scenario of nominal interest rates at their zero lower bound, render-
ing the monetary policy ineffective. Under such scenario, and because short term cycles
might influence long term trends, namely causing short-termed unemployment to persist,
the authors argue that consolidation should be postponed to better yet distant times. Alter-
natively, fiscal stimulus might finance itself since the unemployed would rejoin the active
labour force and make a positive contribution through taxes instead of requiring social
transfers.
Owyang et al. (2013) elaborate a contrasting view on the subject. Using new quar-
terly historical data, they find no evidence whatsoever that fiscal multipliers in the US
tend to be higher during times of recession and high unemployment, and are inclusively
below unity. They do find some evidence of higher multipliers during times of slack in
Canada. If such hypothesis holds true then conducting fiscal consolidation during a reces-
sion is no costlier than doing so afterwards. Consider, for instance, the work of Almeida
et al. (2011) for a small euro area economy. Under a New-Keynesian framework, they
find that, in the long run, fiscal consolidation increases both consumption and output. On
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top of that, Barrios et al. (2010) find evidence pointing to a vigorous and short-termed
fiscal consolidation, also dubbed “cold-turkey” or “cold-shower”, as a means to rapidly
shift the economy towards a higher growth path.
Again, no conclusive position has been attained. The strongest case against a fiscal
adjustment when nominal interest rates are at their zero lower bound comes from the
already referenced study by DeLong and Summers (2012). This study does not take into
account how bond investors perceive increasing fiscal deficits. Mauro et al. (2009) shed a
light on the subject, claiming that fiscal deficits have a negative influence on interest rates.
If that is so, investors either have to be fully convinced that fiscal deficits will not add to
the risk of holding bonds or the strategy is simply unfeasible.
This work relies on the explanatory properties of the proposed model when solving
for an optimal adjustment trajectory of the public debt in order to find out which policy
leads to better results, if a primary fiscal surplus or fiscal deficit, or perhaps a combina-
tion of both. No single ’one-size-fits-all’ strategy will ever exist, since a lot of factors
condition the economy. For instance, EMU countries are constrained by an independent
central bank maintaining a no bailout policy. Furthermore, some particular countries have
restricted access to the bond markets or are under intervention, meaning that they have no
self means of pursuing fiscal stimuli even if desirable. The study here reported is best ap-
propriated to such cases, where fiscal consolidation is not optional but rather compulsory.
3.2.4.4 Fiscal policy rules
For the purpose of this work, we define fiscal policy or budget rule as a permanent con-
straint on fiscal policy, following the definition of Groneck (2009). Such rule exerts a
direct influence on the adjustment path of the stock of public debt. Technically, the bud-
get rule conditions the shape and smoothness of the adjustment path, limiting the set of
feasible solutions. For instance, if the rule allows for running budget deficits, the adjust-
ment might be conducted over a longer timespan. Alternatively, a balanced budget rule
tends to lead to a more rapid adjustment in order to take the economy back to its long-run
trend as fast as possible, even if that comes at the expense of an extreme and harsh fiscal
consolidation in the short-run, with a sudden increase in tax rates, a rapid decrease in
public spending, or both.
Usually, an indirect relationship between the stock of public debt and growth arises
from these models the moment a fiscal budget rule is defined. Such rule is set as an ex-
ogenous and imperious impediment on the government to continuously run fiscal deficits
and accumulate debt indefinitely. The rules found in the literature are most commonly
qualitative, in the sense that they define how fiscal policy should react to a change in the
level of public debt, even if an additional quantitative boundary applies. The most com-
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mon rules either (i) set a target level for the government bonds (Futagami et al., 1993); (ii)
force the government to run a balanced budget fiscal policy (Greiner, 2008); (iii) define a
fixed deficit regime or (iv) a golden rule of public finance (Groneck, 2009). For a given
constant tax rate, these rules influence the composition of the government expenditures
and its variation over time5, in fact imposing a response function of the government bud-
get to the variation of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Quantitative rules, on the other hand, do not
impose a particular functional form but only an upper or lower bound under which the
budget may operate.
The choice of the budget rule to use has growth and welfare implications, as noted by
Greiner (2008), since such rules affect the transitional dynamics of the economy, i.e., the
adjustment trajectories along the Balanced Growth Pact (BGP). Eventually, they may even
give origin to multiple equilibria characterized by distinct growth rates, as in the case of
Maebayashi et al. (2012). Moreover, the choice of the budget rule sets apriori constraints
on the adjustment and, therefore, reduces the admissible candidates to an optimal solution.
Although an optimal debt adjustment path might be found within the problem domain
defined by a particular budget rule, a better solution might lie near if only the dynamic
system obeyed a different rule.
Alternatively, a quantitative budget rule may be used instead. In fact, such a rule
is the method of choice for the prevailing fiscal budget guidelines adopted by the EMU,
underwritten in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and in the Maastricht Treaty, and
discussed in Rubianes (2010). The SGP imposes a maximum fiscal deficit of 3%, not
excluding debt service, that may only be violated under very specific conditions. The
noncompliance may lead to an excessive deficit procedure. Moreover, the debt-to-GDP
ratio should not exceed the 60% threshold. The rationale behind this is that a deficit, d, of
3% on an economy growing at a nominal rate γ of 5% (3% real growth and 2% inflation)
will drive the debt-to-GDP ratio to d/(γ+pi), which for this particular case is 3/5 (60%)6.
Given the potential impact of the budget rule on determining the fiscal policy leading
to an optimal debt adjustment, an overview of the most commonly used fiscal budget rules
along with the underlying assumptions is required in order to fully entail all the feasible
strategies for adjusting debt. We will go through the rules most commonly found in the
literature, providing a brief overview of the underlying mechanism of each fiscal feedback
function in the context of economic growth models.
5See Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) for an interesting discussion on the impact of some of these rules.
6Recall that the debt-to-GDP ratio b is given by B/Y . These variables are assumed to grow at exponential
rates, but for the cycle we can approximate the functions to exhibit linear growth. So, if we assume that
B grows at a constant budget deficit of d, given by B˙ = d, and that Y grows at rate γ , given by Y˙ = γ ,
and we consider the l’Hôpital rule that says that limx→c B/Y = limx→c B˙/Y˙ , it results that the debt-to-GDP
ratio converges to limx→c B˙/Y˙ = d/γ , holding everything else constant. The same result can be obtained by
solving the linear differential equations and finding the limit, i.e., limt→∞(dt+B0)/(γt+Y0) = d/γ .
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3.2.4.4.1 Bond-level targeting
In the original formulation of Futagami et al. (1993), followed by Maebayashi et al.
(2012), it is assumed that the government adjusts its bonds gradually to a target level
according to the following rule
b˙ =−φ(b−b), (3.10)
with b ≡ B/K being gauged by the level of private capital K and b¯ being the target level
at the end time. The adjustment coefficient φ(> 0) defines the smoothness of such ad-
justment. A large value for φ implies a “cold-turkey” approach to fiscal consolidation,
while a small φ allows for a slower, progressive adjustment. What this rule implies is
that the government reduces debt by cutting government spending or raise taxes at each
period according to the difference between the current and target level for the public debt,
respectively. A positive difference, that is, b > b¯, it implies a reduction in the budget
deficit in the proportion given by φ . Conversely, if b < b¯, there is room for expanding in-
vestment in public capital. Since under this model the tax rate is constant and exogenous,
the government exerts no further influence other than setting the public expenditure level
in each period.
Under a loglinearized representation of the original dynamic system, the adjustment
rule given by Equation (3.10) leads to a multiple equilibria of two steady states, one of
low-growth and another of high-growth. Furthermore, there is also a possible indetermi-
nacy of the transition path to the high-growth BGP. To overcome this, Minea and Villieu
(2012) suggest for the level of public bonds, B, to be gauged by the level of output Y , with
b ≡ B/Y . This is not an economic issue, since the change of base of a variable should
exert no influence on the outcome of the system. It is a mathematical hindrance arising
from the linearization of complex dynamic systems.
According to their suggestion, the adjustment rule would then be
θ˙ =−φ(θ −θ), (3.11)
with θ ≡ B/Y and the target level for the public debt θ defined as a ratio to the size of the
economy. Budget rule (3.11), despite not being substantially different from the rule (3.10)
as the endogenous variables grow at the same rate in the BGP ( K˙K =
Y˙
Y = γ), gives origin
to a substantially different dynamic system. As found by Minea and Villieu (2012), using
a debt-to-GDP ratio for the target level of the public debt causes the previous ambiguities
to vanish. The system exhibits then a single unique BGP, thus the adjustment path to
equilibrium is determinate.
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3.2.4.4.2 Balanced budget
Another way of setting an adjustment path involves defining a function between the pri-
mary budget surplus and the debt-to-GDP ratio, a strategy followed by Greiner (2008).
Assume, for instance, that the primary budget surplus to GDP ratio is a positive linear
form of the debt-to-GDP ratio plus a constant, as in
S
Y
= φ +β
B
Y
, (3.12)
where β ∈ R+ reflects how fast the primary budget surplus varies upon a change in the
public debt and φ ∈R determines whether the primary surplus should rise (fall) following
an increase (decrease) in the GDP.
As shown by Greiner (2008), Equation (3.12) is also a necessary condition for the
commitment to the intertemporal budget constraint, imposing that changes in the debt-
to-GDP ratio have to be accommodated by a proportional variation of the government
budget. This avoids any attempt at exploiting a Ponzi game on public debt, where the
government would be constantly rolling over its debt obligations.
This budget rule gives origin to a scenario where government permanently runs a
balanced budget, not implying that the initial level of public is nil, but that it will converge
to zero, with B˙= 0 in the long run. Greiner (2008) shows that when the government starts
with a balanced budget and shifts to a fiscal deficit in order to finance public investment,
it raises the growth rates of private and public capital and, consequently, of the output
growth rate as well, since Y = f (K,Kg) over the transitional path. However, it leads to
a lower growth rate in the long run, unless the government takes fiscal action in order
to rebalance its budget again. This thesis confirms the Keynesian postulates on counter-
cyclical fiscal expansion but raises a warning on perduring detrimental effects in the long-
term.
A balanced budget imposes fiscal discipline but it restricts the path if adjustment. In
an hypothetical scenario of public capital exhibiting a high marginal productivity, a surge
in investment in productive public capital could potentially increase the growth rate of the
economy. When subject to a permanent balanced budget, such investment would have
to be financed upfront with taxes or budget cuts, draining resources from the productive
sector and potentially leading to a state of dynamic inefficiency, this is the case when a
long-term and beneficial investment may not be put forth due to a short-term decrease in
the overall welfare.
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3.2.4.4.3 Golden rule
According to Groneck (2009), the golden rule decrees that the debt issued is to be used
strictly to finance investment in public capital, thereby excluding spurious flows of pub-
lic consumption arising from social transfers or other payouts. The rule states that the
new issued bonds B˙ will have to equal the net investment in public capital, K˙g, less the
amount financed by the tax turnover reserved to public investment, (1−ψ)τY . The frac-
tion ψ ∈ (0,1) represents the share of expenditure assigned to unproductive government
consumption.
B˙ = K˙g− (1−ψ)τY (3.13)
By enforcing the rule stated by Equation (3.13), it then results that public consumption
and other financial obligations will have to be paid for by tax receipts, as in
ψτY =Cg+Cs+ rB, (3.14)
Groneck (2009) shows that employing this rule of public finance increases the long run
growth rate comparatively to adhering to a fixed deficit regime.
3.2.4.4.4 Fixed deficit rule
Under a fixed deficit regime, borrowing is restricted to a certain fixed amount, but the
turnover from the government bonds is not specifically set aside for a particular objective
of public policy, be it either investment in public capital or spurious public spending, as
happens with the golden rule of public finance (see Section 3.2.4.4.3). Following Groneck
(2009), a fixed deficit rule can be represented as
B˙
Y
= d, (3.15)
where d is a constant representing the allowed deficit (as a ratio to the GDP). Since gov-
ernment always runs a fiscal deficit, the growth rate of public debt is always positive in
the long run. Nevertheless, the debt-to-GDP ratio might decrease as a result of the output
growth rate exceeding that of the public debt, γ > γB. It is expected that an adjustment
following a fixed deficit rule results in less sharp transitional trajectories, relying on the
long-run growth of the economy to rebalance public finances. Unfortunately, this scenario
might be sometimes unfeasible in practice due to temporary restrictions in accessing the
foreign capital markets, as the recent European sovereign debt crisis has shown.
Furthermore, the outright benefits of running a fiscal deficit depend on the type and
duration of the public expenditure. Shortsightedness might lead to investment in projects
that temporarily rise employment and have a positive effect on the GDP, but that are hardly
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justifiable when brought to the light of the net present value (NPV), therefore dragging on
the long term growth rate. Also, excessive investment in public capital could potentially
lead to the crowding-out of the private sector.
In the light of political economy, and not ignoring some of the potential social ben-
efits arising from redistribution, the case against running a permanent deficit can be put
forth when we consider social phenomena like corruption. This is something to be taken
into account by the policy maker, as it drains resources out of the productive sector of
the economy. This subject is outside of the scope of this paper, despite being extremely
relevant when refining the type and amount of public expenditure. For an extended review
of the effects of corruption on growth, investment and public expenditure, refer to Paolo
(1999).
3.2.4.4.5 No-rule rule
By not defining an active rule no relationship is established between the public debt and
growth. Since most economic growth models operate under a closed economy, where
assets W are composed of private capital K or public bonds B, servicing debt does not
cause any leakage of resources to the international capital markets, therefore not affecting
growth. Hence, bonds can be immediately reconverted into productive private capital, K,
adding to the output of the economy.
In this case, and considering that in the BGP all the endogenous variables — con-
sumption, private and public capital and debt — grow at the same constant rate, with
C˙
C =
K˙
K =
B˙
B = γ , the government would be running fiscal deficits and adding up to the
infinitely growing stock of public debt.
This scenario is consistent from a theoretical point of view, and has also been ob-
served empirically. The amount of debt is usually close to the GDP level. But, contrary
to what is observed in real economies, the model would allow for debt to exceed the GDP
by a severalfold, especially when the production function exhibits decreasing returns to
scale, while the stock of public debt is unbounded. This is hardly desirable in a world
characterized by open economies where investors demand a risk premium to compensate
for a default and where free capital movements hold. To avoid the unlimited growth of
debt while not applying an active rule, an intertemporal budget constraint like Equation
(3.27) can be defined. This way, it is guaranteed that the public debt is sustainable in the
long-run.
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3.3 Optimal debt adjustment
In this section, we follow Maebayashi et al. (2012) by studying the reduction of public
debt under an endogenous growth model with productive government spending. The
realized expenditure, in the form of public investment, is then converted into public capital
either by adding to the stock of public capital or by replacing depreciated capital units.
This model is based on the work of Futagami et al. (1993) changing only the type of the
input provided by the government. Its contribution to the production function is in the
form of productive public capital, whereas the original formulation considers it to be a
flow of public expenditure on services, in the same fashion as the pioneering work of
Barro (1990).
Literature on debt adjustment under an endogenous growth framework adopts one of
the several possible fiscal rules covered in Section 3.2.4.4. This work parts ways with the
current literature on the subject since no fiscal adjustment rule is assumed. Incorporating
a bond issuance rule limits the role of fiscal policy and reduces the scope of application of
the model in studying the optimal adjustment trajectories following a reduction in public
debt, since a given path for the stock of public debt is implicitly imposed.
More importantly, we deviate from the original formulation and from most of the
endogenous growth literature in the following aspects. First, like Greiner (2005), we
decompose taxes into an income and capital tax rate, τ , and a consumption tax rate, τc,
adding to the roster of fiscal policy instruments; also, we allow the tax rates to be time-
variant, adding further degrees of freedom to the conduction of fiscal policy. Typically,
as noted by Futagami et al. (1993), in order to maintain the tractability of the dynamic
system the tax rate is exogenously set at a constant, given level. This does not pose a
problem in the proposed approach since it employes recent numerical methods to solve
the model, as in Amorim Lopes, A C C Fontes, and B M M Fontes (2013).
Secondly, the model does not require a qualitative budget rule, forcing a relationship
between the level of public debt and how the government budget should react. Instead,
we define a quantitative boundary for the government budget, under which it must operate
using whatever welfare-maximizing fiscal policy it finds adequate. Furthermore, under a
qualitative budget rule, the level of public investment is defined endogenously (see, for
instance, Maebayashi et al., 2012). By not specifying such rule, public investment can be
handled as an exogenous control variable and thus adjusted at each point in time.
We also decouple the international capital markets and the domestic productive and
household sector. Within most endogenous growth frameworks with public debt, house-
holds own assets composed of private capital or government debt bonds, and they earn
interest on the assets. In equilibrium, the market clears and the households are the sole
lenders and creditors of the government. In the proposed approach, domestic households
70
CHAPTER 3. OPTIMAL DEBT ADJUSTMENT IN AN ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL
show a preference for not holding public debt and so the government has to finance its
needs in the international capital markets at the domestic interest rate. It is also assumed
that the price demand for bonds is perfectly elastic for all interest rates and so the govern-
ment has unlimited access to foreign markets and all supply of bonds at a given face or
discount value find a corresponding demand. Furthermore, we neglect risk premium on
public debt. Nonetheless, the government still faces the challenge of finding the best allo-
cation for its expenditure since under this setup, payment of interest on debt is a resource
that fully exits the economy.
The rationale behind this premise is the following: in a closed setup, interest charged
on the resources borrowed reverts back to the economy and never affects the accumulation
of capital directly, unless an exogenous budget rule exists and taxes have to be raised to
pay for debt. There is no restriction to the accumulation of debt, and it happens indepen-
dently of the available resources. If that is the case, there is no implicit requirement that
the marginal productivity of debt has to equal the interest rate. In fact, interest paid on
debt adds to the economy in the form of an additional endowment to families. By decou-
pling the international capital markets, we internalize the requirement that the loans need
to be productive and in excess of the interest rate charged on them. This setup does not
imply that levying taxes is always a preferred alternative to raising debt, since no interest
rate is paid on taxes. In fact, simulations suggest that the relationship is non-monotonic,
since more debt is borrowed when the initial level of debt is relatively low.
Finally, we follow the same procedure as Turnovsky and Fisher (1995) and most of
the strand of literature on economic growth models and we exclude all nominal effects by
abstracting from money, since we are only interested in the real effects on the economy.
3.3.1 The model
We consider a decentralized economy populated by an infinitely long-lived household
with an infinite planning horizon and perfect foresight. We assume no population growth
and its size is normalized to unity, L = 1, without any loss of generality. Households
maximize the time-discounted utility of consumption, firms produce goods using a com-
bination of both private and public capital, and government finances investment in public
capital by either levying taxes on income, capital and consumption or by issuing debt in
the foreign capital markets. 7
7Unless noted otherwise, all variables are time-variant so we omit the time subscript t.
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3.3.1.1 Firms
A single homogeneous good Y is produced by firms with private capital K, public capital
Kg, and labour L. This is a standard Cobb-Douglas production function that incorporates
public capital which is assumed to be a labour augmenting public good8. In addition, we
consider a Hicks-neutral technical progress A > 0 affecting none of the inputs directly.
In this particular case, A is the total factor productivity. The output is then produced as
follows:
Y = AKα(KgL)1−α . (3.16)
The parameter α is the output elasticity of capital, a constant determined by the available
technology. We assume constant returns to scale by imposing α to be positive but less
than one, which results in a linear homogeneous function. Any other range would imply
that public capital has no productive use (case α = 1) or that it has a negative effect on
the production function (case α > 1).
The first-order conditions for profit maximization are given by
fK = αAKα−1K1−αg (3.17)
fL = (1−α)AKαK1−αg (3.18)
where fK and fL denote the marginal productivity of private capital (MPK) and labour
(MPL), respectively. Assuming perfectly competitive markets of goods and inputs, these
first-order conditions can also be interpreted as the interest rate of the private capital, r,
and the wage rate of labour, w. For each given K and ignoring depreciation, each profit-
maximizing firm equates the marginal product of capital to the rental price, r. Hence,
fK = r. Furthermore, it can be shown that Y exhibits positive but diminishing marginal
physical productivity on all factors. Hence, fK > 0, fKK < 0, fKg > 0, fKgKg < 0 and
fL > 0, fLL < 0.
Contrary to Aschauer (1988), where the marginal productivity of the government
expenditure can vary freely and be negative insofar as government intervention has a
negative effect on the production function (e.g., government regulations or inefficient red
tape), we consider productive public investment that can only, in effect, augment the
productivity of the labour factor. Consider, for instance, the installment of a new port or
any public institutions that strive to enforce the rule of law, contribute to a reduction of
8The discussion whether public capital can be a substitute or a complement to private capital in the
production function is still subject to great dispute. Lynde and Richmond (1992) argue that they are com-
plements rather than substitutes, reinforcing our stance.
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risk and uncertainty or create positive externalities in the productive sector9. Therefore,
we are only interested in the case where fKg > 0, which requires that α > 0, as already
noted.
3.3.1.2 Households
Consider a representative household that benefits from consumption, who wishes to max-
imize the overall utility over an infinite-time horizon, which can be written as
max
C
∞ˆ
0
U(C)e−ρtdt (3.19)
where C is private consumption and ρ > 0 is the constant rate of time preference or sub-
jective discount rate. We consider an isoelastic or constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utility function U(C)
U(C) =
C
1−θ
1−θ , θ 6= 1
lnC, θ = 1
(3.20)
where θ > 0 is the coefficient of risk aversion. The household’s budget constraint is given
by
(1− τ)(rK+w) = K˙+(1+ τc)C, (3.21)
where τ ∈ (0,1) is the income/capital tax rate and τc ∈ (0,1) is the consumption tax rate.
As is common in the literature, the dot gives the derivative with respect to time and all
variables are in per-capita quantities since we normalize labour to unity. Equation (3.21)
states that families earn gains from capital rK and wage w and use their after-tax income
(1− τ)(rK +w) to consume (1+ τc)C or to invest in new capital, K˙. Households can
only save by investing private capital since they do not want to hold government bonds.
Families maximize (3.19) subject to (3.21).
Furthermore, the transversality condition expressed by Equation (3.22) is a necessary
bar to Ponzi schemes and must be verified.
lim
t→∞C
−θK · e−ρt = 0. (3.22)
9Evaluating whether the marginal efficiency of the public investment is greater than zero or whether it
might cause the crowding out of the private sector is a relevant issue but outside the scope of this work. For
a review of the evidence, check Lansing (1995).
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3.3.1.3 Government
Government finances public expenditure by levying a time-variant tax on income and cap-
ital at rate τ , on consumption at rate τc, or by issuing new bonds B˙ in the international
capital markets, which provide access to unlimited funding. This allows for the govern-
ment to either run budget deficits (S < 0) or budget surpluses (S > 0) in order to finance
investment in public capital K˙g, that will then revert into the stock of public capital Kg.
Similar to private capital, we are ignoring the depreciation of public capital. The evolution
of public capital is then given by an exogenous path of public expenditure, G
K˙g = G. (3.23)
Assuming no tax is charged on public debt bonds, the law of motion that governs the
accumulation of public debt is given by
B˙ = rB−S, (3.24)
where B are government bonds, S is the primary budget surplus and rB is the interest paid
on the debt bonds, which we assume to be tax exempt. We consider the interest rate paid
on bonds to be equal to the domestic rate of interest. The primary budget consists of the
tax receipts less the government expenditure, given by Equation (3.25)
S = (τcC+ τY )−G (3.25)
By inserting Equation (3.25) into Equation (3.24) we obtain the government budget con-
straint:
B˙ = rB+G− (τcC+ τY ). (3.26)
Equations (3.25) and (3.26) imply that whenever the mix of taxes levied (τcC+ τY ) is
not enough to pay for the public expenditure G and for the costs of servicing debt rB, the
government is forced to issue new debt B˙.
The intertemporal budget constraint of the government is verified if
B(0) =
∞ˆ
0
e−
´ µ
0 r(ν)dνS(µ)dµ ↔ lim
t→∞e
−´ t0 r(µ)dµB(t) = 0 (3.27)
holds for every t. Equation (3.27) is the net present-value borrowing constraint that im-
poses public debt at time zero to equal the future net present-value surpluses. This no-
Ponzi game condition prevents the government from consistently servicing its debt (prin-
cipal and interest) by issuing new debt, barring the rollover. This work focuses in the fiscal
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adjustment from high levels of debt, and so the initial level of debt B(0) does not obey
Equation (3.27). Notwithstanding, the transversality condition is a posteriori condition,
having to be observed only at the final time.
Instead of imposing a qualitative budget regime, we will define a quantitative band
under which the government can run the budget. The budget as a percentage of the output
of the economy has to stay between a lower bound µ and an upper bound η , operating
according to the following rule:
µ ≤ S/Y ≤ η (3.28)
The rule given by Equation (3.28) enforces no particular fiscal policy or automatic feed-
back system of the total budget S+ rB to an increase or decrease in the level of public
bonds, B. Also, no relationship between debt and growth is exogenously inserted into the
model. Setting a maximum deficit ratio of µ is the current practice in the EMU to ensure
that debt stays in a sustainable path (see European Comission, 2007 for further details)
and is required to ensure that the government does not accumulate debt indefinitely.
The upper bound η for the budget surplus serves a similar purpose as the adjustment
coefficient φ in the bond level targeting rule (Section 3.2.4.4.1) or the parameter β in
the balanced budget rule (Section 3.2.4.4.2). It indirectly affects the smoothness of the
adjustment, i.e., whether fiscal consolidation should be more abrupt and sharp or slow and
gradual. In fact, the upper limit set by η does not define what kind of adjustment should
be conducted, therefore being less imposing than the parameters φ or β . What it does is
to prevent a case of postponing the adjustment up until the end time and then proceeding
with an abrupt fiscal consolidation.
3.3.1.4 Equilibrium conditions and the balanced growth path
In order to derive the equilibrium of the economy, it is assumed that the goods and the
labour market clear and that the government has unlimited access to a foreign capital
market willing to buy public debt bonds at the domestic interest rate. The labor market
equilibrium condition is L = 1 since population size is unity and each household sup-
plies one unit of labour inelastically. When the goods market clears, the rate of interest
on capital equals the marginal productivity of private capital and the wage equals the
marginal productivity on labour and so expectably rK+w≡ Y , since the demand-side of
the economy must equal the supply-side. The overall constraint of the economy is then
(for derivation, see Appendix A):
K˙ = (1− τ)Y − (1+ τc)C. (3.29)
The decentralized optimal control problem can be then be stated in the following way:
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max
C
J =
∞ˆ
0
U(C)e−ρtdt, s.t. (3.30)
K˙ = (1− τ)Y − (1+ τc)C K(0) = K0, K ≥ 0
K˙g = G Kg(0) = Kg,0, Kg ≥ 0
B˙ = rB+G− (τY + τcC) B(0) = B0, B ∈ R
Y = AKαK1−αg
S/Y ∈ [µ,η ]
C > 0
τ ∈ (0,1)
τc ∈ (0,1)
(3.31)
and the transversality conditions of the household
lim
t→∞C
−θK = 0, (3.32)
and of the government
lim
t→∞e
−´ t0 r(µ)dµB = 0. (3.33)
The household chooses an allocation {C(t)}∞t=0 that maximizes J and the government
choosing an allocation {G(t),τ(t),τC(t)}∞t=0 that obeys the intertemporal budget con-
straint and the quantitative budget rule given by Equation (3.28). The control variables
are C, G, τ and τC and the state variables are K, Kg and B, subject to the constraints in
(3.31).
Before solving the model, we derive the conditions for a decentralized equilibrium
and for a balanced growth path. An equilibrium allocation is defined as follows:
Definition 3. An equilibrium is a sequence of variables {C(t),K(t),Kg(t),B(t)}∞t=0, a se-
quence of prices {w(t),r(t)}∞t=0, and a sequence of fiscal policies {G(t),τ(t),τC(t)}∞t=0
where the firm maximizes profits, the household solves Equation (3.19) subject to con-
straints (3.21) and the government stays solvent by abiding to the budget constraint set
according to (3.26).
We now characterize a balanced growth path, using the same definition as Greiner
(2008).
Definition 4. A balanced growth path (BGP) is a path such that the endogenous variables
of the economy, consumption, private and public capital grow at the same strictly positive
constant rate such that C˙/C = K˙/K = K˙g/Kg = γ, γ > 0 and γ = γ¯ .
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In Greiner (2008), one of the following three additional conditions is also defined,
given that the balanced budget rule forces a feedback mechanism of the primary budget
on the debt level and households are also the creditors of the public debt: (i) B˙ = 0,
under which the government always runs a balanced budget; (ii) B˙/B = γB, 0 < γB < γ ,
under which the government always runs budget deficits, although at a rate inferior to that
of the growth of the economy; (iii) debt grows at the same level as the economy, with
B˙/B = C˙/C = K˙/K = K˙g/Kg = γ .
This imposition on the growth level of the public debt stems directly from the budget
rule adopted. The quantitative budget band set here imposes no particular trajectory for
the growth of debt, letting it vary freely as long as condition (3.28) is verified. In fact, it is
very likely that during the transitional dynamics of the debt adjustment the level of public
debt might grow at a positive rate, i.e., B˙/B > 0, in the first years of the adjustment.
From Definition 4 it is known that, in the long-run, the economy grows at rate
γ =
K˙
K
= (1− τ∗)AKα−1K1−αg − (1+ τ∗c )
C
K
. (3.34)
Without solving the model, Equation (3.34) tells us that the long-run growth rate of the
economy depends negatively on both tax rates, the income/capital tax rate τ , and the
consumption tax rate τC. On the other hand, it depends positively on the level of public
capital Kg, which is financed by raising taxes or by issuing bonds. Moreover, it shows
that consumption, insofar as it funnels resources out of the productive sector, can be detri-
mental to growth. Its effect is minored, though, when supported by an increase in private
capital from previous investment, causing the ratio C/K to decrease. This is, in fact, a
verification of Say’s Law, purporting the view that (aggregate) supply creates (aggregate)
demand, as in, supply creates the resources to allow for the demand for consumption and
increase investment in the future.
3.3.2 Numerical solution
As can be seen from the optimization problem stated in Equation (3.31), the system gives
origin to a strongly nonlinear set of equations. Similar problems are solved analytically by
first removing the nonlinear dependence by dividing all the endogenous variables by the
stock of private capital K or by the output of the economy Y . The result is an approximated
dynamic system of linear differential equations where an exact optimal control indirect
method, like Pontryagrin’s Maximum Principle, can then be used to obtain the necessary
optimality conditions.
In our particular case, it is not possible to analytically solve the system. The introduc-
tion of time-variant tax rates makes it impossible to remove the nonlinearity of the model.
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Moreover, the use of a quantitative budget band affecting a combination of endogenous
variables inserts several hard constraints for each variable, adding extra complexity to an
already non-trivial system.
Therefore, to study the macroeconomic effects of the debt adjustment we resort to the
numerical framework laid by Amorim Lopes et al. (2013) to solve infinite-horizon non-
linear economic growth models. The procedure consists of first transcribing the infinite-
horizon problem (P∞) into an equivalent finite dimensional representation (PT ). After-
wards, we use the Imperial College London Optimal Control Software10 (ICLOCS) to
discretize and transform the problem into a Nonlinear Programming Problem (NLP). A
state-of-the-art NLP solver, Interior Point Optimizer11 (IPOPT) can then be used to find
optimal trajectories.
3.3.2.1 Finite-horizon problem
The initial step involves the definition of the equivalent finite-horizon problem. To do so,
we need first to calculate the boundary cost W and define the boundary conditions S of
the optimal control problem. For further details, an extended mathematical explanation
and examples of application of the framework in endogenous growth models, refer to
Amorim Lopes, A C C Fontes, and B M M Fontes (2013).
The boundary cost is calculated as follows. First, we normalize consumption so that
it is constant at the end time t¯. From Definition 4 of the BGP we know that consumption
will grow at a constant rate γ . We can express this in the following equation.
Ct =Ct¯ · eγ(t−t¯), t ∈ [t¯,+∞) (3.35)
The boundary cost is then obtained by integrating Equation (3.19) along with the defini-
tion of C(t) given by Equation (3.35). We then obtain (assume θ 6= 1 for the risk aversion
coefficient of the utility function)
W =
∞ˆ
t¯
(Ct¯eγ(t−t¯))1−θ
1−θ e
−ρtdt, (3.36)
which we can integrate to obtain:
W =
eγ(1−θ)−ρ
ρ− γ(1−θ) ·
(Ct¯e−γ t¯)1−θ
1−θ . (3.37)
The boundary cost can then be calculated by using Equation (3.37) and inserting into the
10http://www.ee.ic.ac.uk/ICLOCS/
11https://projects.coin-or.org/Ipopt
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stage cost function J defined in Equation (3.30).
The boundary condition S is, by definition, an invariable set for which the problem
has a finite solution. Again, from Definition 4 we know that under a balanced growth path
the endogenous variables grow at a constant rate. From this we can extract the definition
of the set S
S = {(K, Kg) ∈ R : K˙K −
K˙g
Kg
= 0}, Kt¯ , Kg,t¯ ∈ S. (3.38)
The definition of the boundary cost W in Equation (3.37) and the boundary condition S in
Equation (3.38) guarantee that PT is an equivalent representation of P∞.
3.3.2.2 Base case and calibration
We calibrate the model in order to mimic as close as possible the underlying structural
parameters of an EMU country. The economy does not necessarily start from a steady-
state as that is not required by the framework we use to solve the model.
The intertemporal discount rate ρ is set to 0.05, a value frequently used in the lit-
erature. The risk aversion coefficient θ is set to 1.1, a value such that θ > 1, which
results in risk-averse agents and a strong incentive to smooth consumption. The elasticity
of production with respect to private capital, α , is set to 0.75, a standard value found in
studies like Barro (1990), Greiner (2007), and Maebayashi et al. (2012). The total fac-
tor productivity is set to A = 0.1313. When considering an average inflation of 3% per
year, this allows for a nominal growth rate of up to 5%, well within the values registered
in the last two decades (see Figure 3.6). Without loss of generality, we are abstracting
from the depreciation of both private and public capital with δK = δKg = 0. For the quan-
titative boundaries of the government budget as a share of the GDP, we are defining a
lower bound of µ =−0.05, which corresponds to a maximum budget deficit of 5% of the
GDP, and an upper bound of η = 0.05, meaning that the government cannot run budget
surpluses in excess of 5% of the GDP. The simulations indicate that increasing the upper
bound limit and allowing for larger budget surpluses postpones the fiscal adjustment and
then executes the consolidation in a very sharp way. Therefore, this limit is maintained
within real and frequently observed boundaries. The maximum time-horizon for the debt
adjustment to take place is 30 years.
The initial values for the endogenous state variables are set as follows. We set the
initial stock of private capital is set to K0 = 1. The initial stock of public capital as a
ratio to the stock of private capital is set to Kg,0/K0 = 0.34. This value is taken from
Checherita-Westphal et al. (2012). The initial level of public debt as a ratio to the GDP
is 127% i.e., B0/Y0 = 1.27. This is the debt-to-GDP ratio currently observed in Portugal.
All the parameters and initial values for the variables are summarized in Table 3.1.
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Parameters Initial values
ρ 0.050 K0 1
θ 1.100 Kg,0/K0 0.340
α 0.250 B0/Y0 1.270
A 0.131
δ 0.000
µ -0.05
η 0.05
Table 3.1: Structural parameter values and the initial levels for the endogenous state variables.
3.3.3 Transitional dynamics
The main purpose of a debt adjustment program is to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio back to a
sustainable trajectory in the least costly way that fiscal policy and the underlying structure
of the economy allow, measured in terms of minimizing the loss in welfare created by the
adjustment. Actually, the matter of concern in debt sustainability is the level of debt
relative to expected future budget surpluses, with the debt-to-GDP ratio being only a
point of reference. Figure 3.8 shows an optimal trajectory for the adjustment of the stock
of public debt in absolute levels (top left panel) and when gauged as a share of the GDP
(top right panel). The pre-existing level of the public debt-to-GDP ratio was defined as
B0/Y0 = 1.27 or 127% of the GDP, a value commonly found in the European countries
hit by the sovereign debt crisis.
When the adjustment starts, public debt continues to accumulate both in absolute and
in relative terms. As can be grasped from Figure 3.8, it takes up to seven years to reach the
inflection point where the trajectory of the debt-to-GDP ratio inverts its ascending trend
and starts a long-lasting descent. This year, the debt-to-GDP ratio reaches a maximum of
B/Y = 1.45 or 145% of the GDP. The variation in time of the growth rate of the level of
public debt, B˙/B, is portrayed in the bottom left panel of Figure 3.8. It follows that during
the first seven years of the adjustment, debt continues to rise at a positive, almost constant
rate of ∼ 3%, with B˙/B > 0. At the inflection point, debt starts to decline at a rate of over
3% per year, with B˙/B < 0.
Why does not the adjustment start right away, during the first year? We know that
the initial level of public capital as a percentage of the level of private capital, kg(0) ≡
Kg,0/K0, was set to equate the long-term equilibrium ratio, kg(0) = k∗g. Therefore, the
marginal productivity of public capital was at its optimal level and so no initial upfront
public investment is required. In fact, the investment in public capital is zero for the first
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panel) and as a share of the GDP (right panel). At the bottom, the growth rate of the stock of public debt
(B˙/B) during the first fifteen years of the time-horizon (left panel) and the evolution of the fiscal position
of the economy (right panel).
four years of the adjustment (see Figure 3.11). The reason may lie with the positive effect
of public debt in the private sector, postponing tax revenues and hence promoting a surge
in private investment in the short-run. Figure 3.9 highlights this point. In the short-run,
debt provides a tax relief on the private sector since expenditure does not have to be offset
with tax revenues, with the government allowed to run fiscal deficits. Lower distortionary
tax rates promote economic growth through increased investment in private capital, K˙. In
the long-run, the positive effect exhausts and the negative effects come in. Tax rates have
to be increased in order to ensure that the intertemporal budget constraint is observed, and
debt has to be serviced which is another line of the budget. From that moment on, the
long-run growth rate decreases.
The right panel of Figure 3.8 provides an insight into the evolution of the financial
position of the economy. Rearranging the debt sustainability condition in Equation (3.9)
with respect to the interest rate charged on public debt bonds, we obtain the relationship
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that guarantees a fiscal sustainable position is obtained.
r ≤ S/B+ γ. (3.39)
Plotting both the left-hand and right-hand side of Equation (3.39) for the baseline scenario
it can be shown that a fiscal sustainable position is attained only after the seventh year of
the adjustment (Figure 3.8).
Figure 3.9 provides another insight into the evolution of the rates of growth of pub-
lic debt and of the output of the economy. Depicted in the left panel of the picture we
have a decreasing, yet positive, evolution of the level of public debt up until the sev-
enth year, when inflection takes place and the fiscal adjustment starts. When debt inverts
its trajectory we observe a negative effect on growth, with the growth rate of the output
decreasing slightly. The effect will be thoroughly explained in the next sections, but it
consists mostly of the upsurge in tax revenues required to service debt. On the right panel
we have the growth rates of the remaining endogenous variables, namely of private and
public capital, which reinforce the previous stance on the effects of taxation on the ac-
cumulation of capital. Despite the recovery of the investment in public capital after the
fourth year, its positive effect is offset by the decreasing growth rate of private capital. In
the end, the long-term growth rate of the economy is penalized by the decreasing rate in
the accumulation of private capital.
3.3.3.1 Fiscal policy
The next sections provide an extensive overview of the results obtained in matters of
taxation and the tax mix that better supports recovery. We analyze the variations required
in the investment in public capital, and we also study the government budget, whether
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fiscal consolidation is rapid or slow, and whether the government should run fiscal or
budget surpluses.
3.3.3.1.1 Taxes
The results obtained for the optimal tax policy under adjustment can be found in Figure
3.10. The results suggest starting with the taxation of income and capital at around τ = 5%
of the GDP, followed by a twofold increase in the fifth year of the adjustment. At that
moment, government also starts levying a tax on consumption of no more than τc = 4%.
At the seventh year, an inflection point takes place. The income/capital tax rate τ drops to
zero and the consumption tax rate jumps to around τc = 34%, starting a smooth descent
over the years to τc = 20%.
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Income/capital and consumption tax rates
τ
τC
1
Figure 3.10: Optimal income/capital and consumption tax rates during the adjustment.
This tax mix is consistent with optimal taxation plans in dynamic growth models. As
Roubini and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) point out, under a Ramsey consumption-maximizing
framework and in the short run when the supply of production factors is relatively in-
elastic, it is optimal to heavily tax private capital; in the long-run, taxing capital has
a degenerate effect on private investment, discouraging capital accumulation. Chamley
(1986) and Judd (1985) show that under an endogenous growth model with human capi-
tal in the long run the optimal tax rate on capital converges to zero, which in fact happens
at the inflection point observed in the seventh year. Note that these results may not hold
when public expenditure is endogenous and productive, like in Barro (1990). In that case,
the tax rate on capital income may be different from zero. As seen in Section 3.3.3, the
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seventh year coincides with the inversion of the debt trajectory, bringing it back into a
sustainable and decreasing path.
When tax on income and capital drops to zero, the equation describing the growth
rate of the economy in the BGP simplifies to:
γ =
K˙
K
= AKα−1K1−αg − (1+ τc)
C
K
. (3.40)
Equation (3.40) implies that, as expected, both consumption C and the tax rate on con-
sumption τc may have a detrimental effect on the growth rate, as they reduce the capacity
to accumulate the productive factor capital. Nevertheless, it can be seen that it is optimal
to tax consumption instead of capital while the supply factors are no longer inelastic, i.e.,
in the long run.
Furthermore, the budget constraint of the government no longer depends on taxes on
capital and income, as the following equation shows
B˙ = rB+G− τcC, (3.41)
which implies that the financing of the public expenditure G will depend exclusively on
taxation over consumption, τcC. Crossing this equation with the reduction in the debt
service costs (right panel of Figure 3.12), it becomes clear that the tax rate on consumption
starts decreasing the moment that the debt service costs start reducing. In fact, whenever
they converge to zero, the taxes levied should equal the amount necessary to invest in
public capital so as to keep the marginal productivity of public capital at its optimal level.
3.3.3.1.2 Public expenditure
Most of the studies concerning the evolution of public capital and public debt assume the
amount of government spending to be exogenously provided (see, for instance, Barro,
1990) or determined endogenously, resulting from the application of a given budget rule
(see Futagami et al., 1993, 2008; Maebayashi et al., 2012). In the case considered here,
government expenditure is a control variable and so it can be subject to sudden upheavals
or reversals.
Figure 3.11 illustrates the trajectory of public expenditure G during the adjustment
(left panel). Recall that G is direct investment in public capital Kg and so it affects the
evolution of the stock of public capital (right panel). As it can be seen, until the fourth
year, investment in public capital is nil, with G = 0. The effect in Kg is direct and linear,
causing a stagnation in the evolution of the stock of public capital. Investment in public
capital resumes after the forth year, with a jump to approximately 7% of the GDP devoted
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to public investment.
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3.3.3.1.3 Government budget
The government budget reflects the fiscal policy adopted, uniting both the tax policy and
the schedule of the public expenditure. The total budget also includes the costs of ser-
vicing debt, rB, while the primary budget excludes the financial costs. The left panel of
Figure 3.12 depicts the sequence of budget deficits and surpluses during the adjustment.
As it can be seen, the total budget as a share to the GDP, S/Y , stays between the lower and
upper bounds defined, such that−0.05≤ S/Y ≤ 0.05. Until the seventh year, government
runs a sequence of budget deficits of 5% of the GDP. Afterwards, the policy shifts to a
sequence of budget surpluses of 5% of the GDP. If we discount the costs of servicing debt,
the schedule of the primary budget is always negative, pointing to fiscal surpluses. The
differential between the two lines reflects the amount of the government budget devoted
to servicing debt.
In fact, when observing the right panel of Figure 3.12 along with the stall in public
expenditure suggested in Figure 3.11 we verify that the first seven years are strictly for
paying off debt in order to bring debt back into a sustainable trajectory.
3.3.3.2 Private sector
The adjustment in the debt-to-GDP ratio affects the private sector mainly through two
channels: (1) by increasing taxes τ and τC, either the investment in productive private
capital reduces, possibly decreasing the long-run growth rate of the economy, or (2) the
levels of consumption have to decrease due to the diminishing net wealth of the house-
holds. The other channel is the investment in public capital, or lack thereof, and how
it can influence the production function and, thus, the output of the economy. Equation
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1Figure 3.12: Primary budget, discounting the payment of interest on debt plotted along with the total budget
during the adjustment (left panel); the interest payments on public debt as a share of the GDP (right panel).
(3.21) shows the effect of taxes levied by the government on the evolution of the stock of
public capital and on consumption.
Expectably, the private sector is affected by the adjustment. Investment-wise, as
Figure 3.13 shows, the evolution of private capital suffers a decrease after the seventh
year of adjustment (left panel). As a share of the output of the economy (right panel),
private capital increases considerably to about K/Y = 10.37, decreasing back to its initial
level at the beginning of the adjustment, K/Y = 10.02.
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1Figure 3.13: The evolution of the private capital in absolute levels (left panel) and as a share of the GDP
(right panel).
Consumption-wise, the left panel of Figure 3.14 highlights that in absolute levels
consumption continues to grow on a steady trend from its initial level C0, following the
growth of the economy. As a share of the GDP, it decreases slightly in the first seven
years of the adjustment from an initial level of C/Y = 0.63 to C/Y = 0.627. Nevertheless,
it grows considerably in the following years, reaching a maximum of 70% of the share
of the GDP (right panel). Given the decrease in the growth rate of private capital, it can
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be seen that consumption takes a larger share of the GDP, but it still verifies the Barro-
Ricardo equivalence. Despite changes in the rates, families keep their consumption levels
as a share of private capital relatively proportional.
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Two other macroeconomic indicators may be relevant. The first is the evolution in
the formation of fixed capital or net investment as a share of the GDP, observable in the
left panel of Figure 3.15. The decrease in investment observed right before the fifth year,
going down from about 32% to 25% of the GDP ratio can be explained by observing the
variation in the capital/income tax rate τ in Figure 3.10. In the seventh year, investment
plummets again to below 16% of the GDP. Although the capital/income tax rate is now set
to τ = 0, tax on consumption increases dramatically, affecting the accumulation of private
capital, as households try to maintain their level of consumption. Afterwards, following a
decreasing trend in the consumption tax rate τc, investment starts recovering again, albeit
at a very slow pace, converging to around 17% of the GDP in the long run.
The other indicator is the output of the economy depicted in the right panel of Figure
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B0/Y0 (B/Y )MAX γ0 γ∗
0.6 1.01 0.0252 0.02099
0.8 1.10 0.0249 0.02048
1.0 1.22 0.0246 0.01996
1.27 1.45 0.0242 0.01926
1.4 1.49 0.0241 0.01892
1.6 1.64 0.0238 0.01840
2.0 2.0 0.0160 0.01761
Table 3.2: Long-run growth rates for different values of the initial debt-to-GDP ratios.
3.15. It can be seen that after the seventh year of the adjustment, the slope of the output
function decreases slightly. In fact, looking at the downfall in investment in both public
and private production factors it is expectable to observe a decrease in the output. What
this shows is that the short-run adjustment required to curb down debt has a long-term
impact on the output of the economy. This point is better reinforced in the next section.
3.3.4 Debt and the growth
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and the growth rates of the economy for varying initial levels of public debt (right panel) B(0)/Y (0) =
(0.80, 1.00 1.27 1.40).
The key to understand the relationship between debt and growth and how government-
backed bonds can maximize the short-run growth rate is better reflected when running
multiple simulations holding everything constant except for the initial level of public debt,
B(0). Figure 3.16 and Table 3.2 expose this point. There is a clear negative relationship
between the pre-existing level of public debt and the long-run growth of the economy
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at the final time. When running the simulation with an initial level of B0/Y0 = 0.6 a fi-
nal growth rate of γ = 0.02099 is obtained, while for an initial level of B0/Y0 = 1.6 the
economy grows at a rate of γ = 0.01840, a significant decrease of ∼ 13% in the long-run
growth rate. Furthermore, as the right panel of Figure 3.16 attests, the short-run growth
rate of the economy is also hit by the initial level of public debt in two distinct ways:
when debt is allowed to grow, the growth rate of the economy is higher due to the fact
that no taxes have to be levied; low levels of initial debt allow higher short-term growth
rates to be sustained for longer.
The left panel of Figure 3.16 puts in evidence two additional interesting remarks.
First, regardless of the initial value of public debt, debt follows exactly the same path the
moment it inverts its ascending trajectory. Secondly, when adjustment starts will depend
on the initial amount of public debt. Low levels of public debt require no immediate
fiscal consolidation and debt is allowed to grow for a period. High levels of public debt
require immediate attention and the adjustment starts much sooner, although not at the
initial time.
These observations are the basis for the following conjectures.
Conjecture 1. The higher the initial level of public debt B(0), the lower the short-run
and the long-run growth rates of the economy, assuming all the other initial parameters
and conditions are held constant.
Resulting from Conjecture 1, it is immediate to see that the longer it takes for a govern-
ment to decide to curb its level of public debt, the greater the penalty on the growth rates
of the economy and, thus, as we will demonstrate, on the general welfare of the society.
To see why, recall that in equilibrium, the endogenous variables grow at the same rate
γ and so we have that C˙C = γ . Solving w.r.t. C we obtain Ct = C0e
´ t
0 γυdυ for the short-
run, when the growth rate γ is time-dependent, and Ct =C0eγt for the long-run when the
growth rate is constant. Inserting the equation for Ct into Equation (3.19) we obtain the
present value of the welfare of the economy
J0 =
C01−θ
(θ −1)ρ +
ˆ ∞
0
(ˆ t
0
γυdv
)
e−ρtdt. (3.42)
Therefore, the higher the long-run growth rate γ , the higher the welfare of the economy.

The short-term increase in the levels of public debt and its contribution to a higher
short-run growth rate stems from the fact that issuing debt and running fiscal deficits post-
pones levying taxes on capital/income or consumption, which have a distortionary effect
on the accumulation of capital. Therefore, resorting to debt instead of raising tax rates
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provides a boost in the level of private capital, an input factor in the production function
and thus, in the output of the economy. This gives origin to the following conjecture.
Conjecture 2. Up to a certain point, increasing levels of public debt may lead to eco-
nomic growth by postponing distortionary tax rates and promoting investment in private
or public capital, inputs in the production function of the economy that can be accumu-
lated.
To see why, consider the long-run growth rate of the economy provided by Equation
(3.34). The lower the tax rates on income/capital and consumption, τ and τc, the higher
the growth rate, since:
∂ K˙K
∂τ
< 0,
∂ K˙K
∂τc
< 0. (3.43)
This reduction in the tax rates leads to a surge in the accumulation of private capital,
which boosts the growth rate of the economy.
The results also suggest that the function of the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio
may have a non-monotonic, U-shape form, given that in some adjustments the debt-to-
GDP increases prior to being curtailed, but in other scenarios (e.g., when the initial level
of debt is 200% of the GDP), the adjustment starts right away and the debt-to-GDP ratio
decreases monotonically.
90
CHAPTER 3. OPTIMAL DEBT ADJUSTMENT IN AN ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL
3.4 Remarks and policy implications
No model or scientific achievement is expected to give an absolute sentence on a given
topic. A good theory is nothing more than a set of assumptions and deduced conclusions
that has survived falsification, at least until the day. As Karl Popper once put it, no theory
can ever be proved, only falsified. This is epistemologically valid for social sciences,
for economics and for natural sciences alike. Newton’s laws still hold true because no
evidence has been found on the contrary. At least for large objects.
Provided this, a cautious approach is always recommended when evaluating new
developments in economic theory. This work is no exception. We consider that this
work serves two different purposes. The first is to present a new numeric framework
for solving infinite-horizon endogenous growth model. We have exposed the benefits of
such framework by pointing out that no linearization is required, that taxes can now be
time-variant and that a quantitative budget rule can be used. We consider such task was
duly achieved and that it can be an important contribution to the toolkit of the macro-
economist. The second is to study the optimal debt adjustment in an endogenous growth
model by employing the developed framework and derive policy recommendations.
The results are extremely interesting, which we present next:
1. The initial phase of the fiscal adjustment consists in a radical cut in government
spending and an increase in the capital/income tax rates. In the short-run, the op-
timal policy consists in taxing capital and income, given that the supply of capital is
inelastic in the short-term; at the same time, a significant reduction in government
expenditure, which in this case consists of public investment, should also be un-
dertaken. Government chooses to withhold investment in public capital in the first
years of the adjustment.
2. As soon as debt inverts its trajectory, the capital income tax drops to zero, con-
sumption tax is the major source of financing and public investment resumes. In
the long-run, since capital income taxes discourage capital accumulation, there is
a shift in the tax policy and the tax revenues are now fully supported by a tax on
consumption, with the tax on capital and income converging to zero. Investment in
public capital is resumed afterwards, converging again to its equilibrium trend. This
suggests that an optimal fiscal consolidation relies heavily on curbing the levels of
public spending.
3. When the fiscal adjustment starts will depend on the initial level of public debt.
The initial level of public debt will condition the adjustment trajectory. For low
levels of public debt, it is optimal to issue further public debt prior to proceeding
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with a fiscal consolidation so as to keep distorting taxes low and promote invest-
ment in growth-enacting private and public capital. For high levels of public debt,
adjustment commences right away, at time zero.
4. The initial level of public debt conditions the short-run and long-run growth rate
of the economy. The larger the level of initial public debt, the lower the short-run
and long-run growth rate of the economy. The effects of high levels of public debt
are notorious and long-lasting. For a larger time window, the economies converge
to the same growth rate, but since the growth rates exhibited during the transition
are different, they converge necessarily to different equilibriums.
5. Simulations seem to suggest that the relationship between debt and growth is of
an inverted U-shape form. Although debt can promote a short-run surge in growth
as it allows distortionary taxes to stay low, unsustainable levels are detrimental to
the economy and take a long period to accommodate for. This suggests that fiscal
policy should be very careful of unsustainable debt levels and act accordingly.
We hope this work will open the way to further research in optimal debt adjustment and
to help to finally untangle the relationship between debt and growth.
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3.5 Conclusion and future work
In this work we studied the fiscal policy that best suits an optimal adjustment of the
levels of public debt, taking into consideration the general welfare of the society. We
did so following a new approach, that is, by using a nonlinear endogenous growth model
with time-variant tax rates and a quantitative budget rule. By doing so, we abstain from
the errors introduced by the log-linearization of the model, the strong assumption of tax
constancy and the functional form imposed by a qualitative budget rule.
Our results confirm part of the literature with respect to optimal tax policy. As pre-
dicted, capital can be subject to strong taxation given the inelastic property in the supply
of private capital, shifting afterwards to a consumption-based taxation. Also, they suggest
that an initial cut in public investment may be appropriate, at least under our assumption
that the country is already well-equipped with public infrastructure. Moreover, we show
that the initial level of public debt severely conditions the short-run and long-run growth
rate of the economy and, therefore, cannot be ignored. We also find a ceiling in the debt-
to-GDP ratio that depends on the initial level of public ratio. Furthermore, the timing
of the adjustment, i.e., when it begins, depends on the initial level of public debt. Low
initial levels of public debt postpone the adjustment. On the contrary, for levels higher
than 160 percent of the GDP, the adjustment starts right away. Finally, we infer that there
is a non-monotonic, inverted U-shape relationship between debt and growth.
Nevertheless, more remains to be done. Due to the fact that the model can only be
solved numerically, conjectures lack the assertiveness of proved propositions. Therefore,
a more detailed simulation of multiple scenarios is required. Moreover, given the novelty
of both the framework, some of the properties of the model like time-variant tax rates
and a quantitative budget rule, there is a whole new realm of possibilities that have to
be experimented with. Future research should study the relationship between debt and
growth now that the analytical intractability of the endogenous growth models no longer
poses a problem. Hopefully, we have supplied the tools that prosperity demands for.
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Equilibrium in decentralized markets
Most of the endogenous growth models with public debt documented in the literature,
like Futagami et al. (1993), Greiner (2007) or Maebayashi et al. (2012), consider a closed
economy where households own assets, W , consisting of a mix between public debt bonds
B and capital K. This implies that since domestic households own the public debt, the debt
service costs remain within the economy and can, in principle, be immediately allocated
to investment in new capital, to consumption, or to acquire more public debt.
In equilibrium, it is assumed that markets clear and hence W ≡ B+K. The house-
hold’s constraint then becomes
B˙+ K˙ = (1− τ)(rK+ rB+w)− (1+ τc)C, (A.1)
which coupled with the budget constraint of the government
B˙ = (1− τ)rB− (τY + τcC−G) (A.2)
gives origin to global constraint of the economy
K˙ = Y −C−G. (A.3)
In the model proposed here, the international capital market for issuing and buying
public debt is decoupled from the domestic market. Furthermore, we assume that house-
holds have a preference for holding no domestic public debt. Their assets, then, consist
only of private capital with W ≡ K. In this case, the global constraint of the economy
becomes
K˙ = (1− τ)(rK+w)− (1+ τc)C. (A.4)
Since rK+w≡ Y , inserting Equation (3.17) and Equation (3.18) into Equation (A.4) the
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global constraint of the economy can be rewritten as
K˙ = (1− τ)Y − (1+ τc)C. (A.5)
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